Last week, a Ninth Circuit panel held that plaintiffs in five related cases lacked standing to pursue their FCRA claims. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that the allegation that a credit report contained misleading information, absent any indication that a consumer tried to engage in or was imminently planning to engage in any transactions for which the alleged misstatements in the credit reports made or would make any material difference, does not constitute a concrete injury.

The Bottom Line

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York entered a decision confirming the applicability of the Court’s bar date order as it relates to a pension fund’s claim for withdrawal liability filed after the bar date, despite the fact that the withdrawal occurred after the deadline for filing proofs of claim.

What Happened?

HIGHLIGHTS:

The Bottom Line

In a prior blog post, “Making Sense of The Circuit Split on the Enforcement of Make-Whole Provisions in Bankruptcy,” we discussed the circuit split on the enforcement of a make-whole premium triggered by a bankruptcy petition. Shortly after that post was published, the U.S.

The Institutional Limited Partner Association (ILPA) has published recommendations for how “GP-led fund restructurings” should be organised. These transactions occur when a fund sponsor (GP/manager) introduces a secondary purchaser to buy assets out of one of its existing funds, typically into a new fund structure where the same GP is the manager. Such transactions are complex and inevitably throw up conflict issues. Investors regularly complain that GPs are short on transparency and slapdash with timelines when trying to do one of these deals.

It always amazes me when, after more than a half-century of Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) jurisprudence, an issue one thinks would arise quite commonly appears never to have been decided in a reported case. Such an issue was recently decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in an adversary proceeding in the Pettit Oil Co. Chapter 7 case.[1]

The phrase ipso facto is Latin for “by the fact itself.” Ipso facto clauses are sometimes included in lease and purchase contracts, and they assert that if the lessee or purchaser becomes insolvent, or files for bankruptcy protection, then the contract has been breached. In other words, under such a clause the very act of filing for bankruptcy protection constitutes a breach of contract that absolves the other party of any further contract obligations.

Junior creditors are often described as holding a “silent second” under standard intercreditor agreements, which address the relative rights of senior and junior creditors and the extent to which junior creditors can seek to enforce remedies without the consent of senior creditors. The increased complexity of capital structures has led to litigation over the degree junior creditors must remain silent after the borrower has commenced a chapter 11 case.

We now address assets sales under Bankruptcy Code section 363. The statute allows debtors to use, sell, or lease their property in the ordinary course of business without court permission. But a debtor’s use, sale, or lease of property outside the ordinary course of business requires court approval. And courts will usually approve a debtor’s disposition of property if it reflects the debtor’s reasonable business judgment and an articulated business justification.