Following several weeks of speculation about how pending cash collateral, cash management, and debtor-in-possession financing motions might affect basic principles of structured finance, the bankruptcy court deferred a final ruling on the motions and extended the interim cash collateral order. In so doing, Judge Allan L. Gropper of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York suggested that CMBS lenders organize themselves so that common issues can be identified and resolution expedited.

In In re Arch Wireless,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a creditor who asserted claims against the debtor in various correspondence between the parties was a “known” claimant of the debtor’s estate entitled to direct notice of the bar date by which it must file a proof of claim. The Court of Appeals concluded that publication notice was insufficient to inform the creditor of the bar date or of the terms of the confirmed plan, even though the creditor was generally aware of the debtor’s bankruptcy filing.

In March 2008, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided In re Airadigm Communications, Inc. (Airadigm Communications, Inc. v. FCC),1 a case that built upon the Supreme Court’s decision in FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications, Inc (“NextWave”).2 In NextWave, the Supreme Court held that the FCC’s participation in a bankruptcy proceeding is subject to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

Congress enacted amendments to the United States Bankruptcy Code in 2005 designed to increase certainty in the marketplace for mortgage loan repurchase agreements and other financial contracts.1 The contours – and limits – of these amendments were recently explored by the Delaware bankruptcy court in Calyon New York Branch v. American Home Mortgage Corp.

Last month, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued an important, 28-page opinion that confirmed a jury verdict, holding former officers and directors of a not-for-profit health care provider in bankruptcy, jointly and severally liable to the facility’s creditors – in the amount of $2.25 million – for breach of fiduciary duty in failing to properly oversee and manage the non-profit entity.  Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors ex rel. Lemington Home for Aged v. Baldwin (In re Lemington Home for Aged), No.

On January 7, 2013, the Judge Robert D. Drain of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a dispute concerning the debtors’ use of cash collateral was not subject to arbitration, notwithstanding a broad arbitration clause in the parties’ underlying agreement, because the decision to allow a debtor to use cash collateral constituted a “core” issue and was a fundamental aspect of the bankruptcy process. In re Hostess Brands, Inc., No. 12-22052 (RDD), 2013 WL 82914 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2013).

Background

Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit recently created a split of authority regarding the rejection intellectual property licenses in bankruptcy by upholding a decision protecting a trademark licensee’s ability to use a debtor licensor’s trademark after the licensing agreement had been rejected. Chicago American Manufacturing’s licensing contract with debtor Lakewood Engineering & Manufacturing authorized CAM to sell fans under Lakewood’s mark.

On July 9, 2012, Judge Mary F. Walrath of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware disallowed a claim for rejection damages related to a real estate development agreement, because the claim had been released upon the termination of an LLC Agreement, and the underlying ground lease never came into existence.  In re Magna Entm’t Corp., 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3089 (Bankr. D. Del. July 9, 2012).  

Background

The Supreme Court held 8-0 that section 1129(b)(2) of the bankruptcy code requires that if a debtor proposes to sell property under a plan of reorganization it must permit secured lenders to submit credit bids in the sale process.  The outcome is consistent with our views of the rights of secured lenders under appropriate bankruptcy practice – however, the Supreme Court’s analysis eschews policy concerns and focuses almost exclusively on the plain language of the statute and applicable canons of statutory construction.

On February 16, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that a discounted cash flow analysis constituted “a commercially reasonable determinant[] of value” for purposes of section 562(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code.1 In so doing, the court upheld the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware decision sustaining the objection of American Home Mortgage Holdings, Inc.