Few areas of law are as confusing—or as important to understand—as the growing
intersection of employment and bankruptcy law. In recent years, funding shortfalls
in multi-employer pension plans, which cover roughly 20 percent of U.S. workers
with defined-benefit plans, have increased pressure on participating employers
to reduce their contributions or even withdraw entirely. Although employers taking
these actions would incur withdrawal liability as a consequence, that liability can

The U.S. Supreme Court handed down its first bankruptcy decision of 2013 on May 13. In a unanimous ruling, the court held in Bullock v. BankChampaign N.A., 2013 BL 125909 (U.S. May 13, 2013), that the term “defalcation” for purposes of denying discharge of a debt under section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code includes a “culpable state of mind” requirement involving knowledge of, or gross recklessness with respect to, the improper nature of a fiduciary’s behavior.

The ability of a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”) to sell bankruptcy estate assets “free and clear” of competing interests in the property has long been recognized as one of the most important advantages of a bankruptcy filing as a vehicle for restructuring a debtor’s balance sheet and generating value. Still, section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, which delineates the circumstances under which an asset can be sold free and clear of “any interest in such property,” has generated a fair amount of controversy.

The U.S. Supreme Court in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2012 WL 1912197 (May 29, 2012), held that a debtor may not confirm a chapter 11 "cramdown" plan that provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of existing liens, but does not permit a secured creditor to credit-bid at the sale. The unanimous ruling written by Justice Scalia (with Justice Kennedy recused) resolved a split among the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits.

The powers and protections granted to a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession under the Bankruptcy Code are numerous and far-reaching.

Two recent decisions from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the "Bankruptcy Court") have further contributed to the rapidly expanding volume of chapter 15 jurisprudence. In In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 2011 WL 1998374 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2011), and In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 2011 WL 1998376 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2011), bankruptcy judge Burton R. Lifland rendered two decisions involving offshore "feeder funds" that invested in the massive Ponzi scheme associated with Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC ("BLMIS").

Administrations, including "pre-packs", are not capable of constituting "insolvency proceedings...instituted with a view to the liquidation of the assets of the transferor" within the meaning of Regulation 8(7) of TUPE. Where there is a sale of an undertaking by an administrator, the employees assigned to the undertaking will automatically transfer to the buyer and receive unfair dismissal protection.

Key facts

The penultimate year in the first decade of the second millennium was one for the ages, or at least most people hope so.

For the third time in as many years, the Delaware Chancery Court has handed down an important ruling interpreting the interaction between federal bankruptcy law and Delaware corporate law. The thorny question this time was whether a bankruptcy court’s determination that the directors of a corporation acted in good faith when they authorized a chapter 11 filing precluded a subsequent claim that the directors breached their fiduciary duties by doing so. The Delaware Chancery Court concluded that it did, ruling in Nelson v.

The ability to sell assets during the course of a chapter 11 case without incurring transfer taxes customarily levied on such transactions outside of bankruptcy often figures prominently in a potential debtor’s strategic bankruptcy planning. However, the circumstances under which a sale and related transactions (e.g., recording of mortgages) qualify for the tax exemption have been a focal point of dispute for many courts, including no less than four circuit courts of appeal.