In the fourth quarter of 2008, global credit markets were virtually frozen, leading many distressed businesses and their constituents to take measures to avoid bankruptcy filings at almost all costs. Without access to debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing, bankruptcy most often results in liquidation – and with lenders reluctant to provide new money, even in exchange for superpriority and/or priming liens, total collapse became an increasingly common result.
How real is the threat to the District of Delaware and the Southern District of New York as the prime venue choices for corporate Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases? It appears that both are safe, at least for now.
The conflict between sections 363(f) and 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code involves the question of whether a debtor-le
Section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code provides, subject to certain exceptions, that the Bankruptcy Code “does not affect any right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt owing by such creditor to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against a claim of such creditor against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case.” Debts are considered “mutual” when they are due to and from the same persons or entities in the same capacity.
Despite the increasing prominence of pre-packaged or pre-negotiated chapter 11 cases in recent years, not every bankruptcy filing by or against a company is a carefully planned event orchestrated over a period of months or even years to achieve a workable reorganization, sale, or liquidation strategy. Sometimes, unanticipated circumstances precipitate a bankruptcy filing.
Judge Robert W. Sweet of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held inCT Investment v. Carbonell and Grupo Costamex, 2012 WL 92359 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2012), that comity should be extended to an order issued by a Mexican district court overseeing the Mexican bankruptcy proceeding (concurso mercantil) of Cozumel Caribe S.A. de C.V. (“Cozumel Caribe”) under Mexico’s Ley de Concursos Mercantiles (the “Mexican Business Bankruptcy Act”). In so holding, Judge Sweet stayed the U.S.
The ability to sell an asset in bankruptcy free and clear of liens and any other competing “interest” is a well-recognized tool available to a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”). Whether the category of “interests” encompassed by that power extends to potential successor liability claims, however, has been the subject of considerable debate in the courts. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this controversial issue in Olson v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 445 B.R. 243(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
Two recent decisions from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the "Bankruptcy Court") have further contributed to the rapidly expanding volume of chapter 15 jurisprudence. In In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 2011 WL 1998374 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2011), and In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 2011 WL 1998376 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2011), bankruptcy judge Burton R. Lifland rendered two decisions involving offshore "feeder funds" that invested in the massive Ponzi scheme associated with Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC ("BLMIS").
In the July/August 2010 edition of the Business Restructuring Review, we reported on an important ruling handed down by bankruptcy judge James M. Peck in the Lehman Brothers chapter 11 cases addressing the interaction between the Bankruptcy Code’s general setoff rules (set forth in section 553) and the Code’s safe harbors for financial contracts (found principally in sections 555, 556, and 559 through 562). In In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 433 B.R. 101 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.