On March 18, 2019, Judge Stuart M. Bernstein of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision enforcing a mortgage lender’s claim for a prepayment premium (a/k/a make-whole or yield maintenance premium) notwithstanding the lender’s prepetition acceleration of the loan due to the debtor’s default.
On October 4, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that a contractual right of a triangular (non-mutual) setoff was unenforceable in bankruptcy, even though the contract was safe harbored. In re Lehman Brothers, Inc., No. 08-01420 (JMP), 2011 WL 4553015 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2011).
On July 23, 2015, in an action arising from the huge TCEH chapter 11 bankruptcy, Judge Paul A. Engelmayer of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion in Delaware Trust Company v.
In two recent decisions, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has interpreted narrowly certain of the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions.
On December 13, 2012, Judge Vincent L. Briccetti from the United States District Court of the Southern District of New York denied the appellant Notes Trustee’s request to compel payment of an administrative expense claim.
On May 5, 2009, Judge James Peck, the Bankruptcy Judge in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy cases, held that the safe harbor provisions of the Bankruptcy Code do not override the mutuality requirements for setoff under section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. As a consequence, the Bankruptcy Court prohibited Swedbank, a non-debtor counter party to a swap agreement, from setting off pre-petition claims against Lehman against funds collected for Lehman’s account postpetition. See In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Bankr. Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
March 9, 2012: Publication of Dynegy Examiner’s Report
A creditor’s ability to vote on a plan of reorganization is one of its most fundamental rights in a chapter 11 bankruptcy. For strategic investors in distressed debt, the power to vote—and potentially control a voting class (or obtain a blocking position in that class)— can be a critical tool in maximizing value and return on investment. Investors should be aware, however, that a recent decision by Judge Robert E.
On November 7, 2012, Judge Lewis A. Kaplan for the United States District Court of the Southern District of New York held that payments made in connection with a leveraged buyout to holders of privately held securities were safe harbored under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code notwithstanding the fact that the payments passed directly from the purchaser to the seller without the use of any financial intermediary. AP Services LLP v. Silva, et al., Case No. 11-03005 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2012).
On January 25, 2010, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that provisions in a CDO indenture subordinating payments due to Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc., as swap provider, constituted unenforceable ipso facto clauses under the facts and circumstances of this case. The Court also held that, because the payment priority provisions were not contained in the four corners of a swap agreement, the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor protections, which generally permit the operation of ipso facto clauses, did not apply.