Much is being written about the significant losses suffered by automobile suppliers to both the domestic and transplant automobile manufacturers. These losses are creating alarm among many others, including the OEMs themselves, according to Dave Hannon at Purchasing Magazine.

On April 8, 2009, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling that creates an additional hurdle for companies providing single-employer pension funds when seeking to reorganize through a bankruptcy. In general, the termination of a pension plan can give rise to a per-employee termination premium (a “Termination Premium”) owed by the company terminating the plan to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (“PBGC”), the quasi-governmental entity that insures pension plans.

Retiree benefits are often a central issue in bankruptcy cases. For many employers the high cost of retiree medical benefits has been a significant contributing factor to the Chapter 11 filing and a matter of ongoing concern if the debtor is to be able to successfully reorganize. Understandably, employees, retirees and unions are equally concerned about the status of retiree benefits. Their obvious interest is to attempt to prevent the erosion of benefits that had been expected to be available during retirement.

In In re City of Vallejo,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California held recently that the City of Vallejo has the authority to reject its collective bargaining agreements with the city’s firefighters and electrical workers as part of its chapter 9 bankruptcy proceeding without going through the process detailed in section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court determined that a municipality does not need to comply with the stringent requirements that corporations face when seeking to reject a collective bargaining agreement (a “CBA”).

The bankruptcy case of the City of Vallejo, Calif., the largest chapter 9 case filed since the Orange County case 15 years ago, continues to produce significant decisions on issues of first impression. First, following a lengthy trial, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California, where the City's case is pending, found that the City met all of the qualifications necessary to be a municipal debtor under chapter 9. In re City of Vallejo, 2008 WL 4180008 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2008).

Today, in the sixth largest bank failure in U.S.

On June 17, 2009, the Seventh Circuit examined the tax practitioner privilege in Valero Energy Corporation v. U.S., 103 AFTR 2d 2009-2683. Valero, a large oil refiner, expanded its operations in 2001 by acquiring Ultra Diamond Shamrock Corporation (“UDS”). Prior to the acquisition, Ernst & Young developed a restructuring and refinancing plan for UDS’s Canadian subsidiaries. Valero asked its tax advisors, Arthur Anderson, to review the plan and provide additional tax advice.

During the bankruptcy cycle following the recession of 2001, numerous debtors – notably airlines such as US Airways and United Air Lines, Inc. – undertook “distress terminations” of their ERISA-qualified defined benefit pension plans, which are insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). The PBGC found itself holding large general unsecured claims arising from significant underfunding of pension plans insured by the PBGC as a result of these terminations. Efforts by the PBGC to obtain either administrative priority or secured status for these claims invariably failed.1

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York entered an order on Sept. 17, 2009, granting a motion filed by Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (“LBSF”) to compel Metavante Corporation (“Metavante”) to continue to make payments to LBSF under an ISDA Master Agreement.

The US government’s foray into restructuring the ailing US automotive industry has been widely reported in the media and represents the most substantial federal intervention in the private business sector since the Great Depression. In Chrysler’s case, the government took the unprecedented step of orchestrating a “surgical” Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing with the primary goal of utilizing the provisions of Section 363 of the US Bankruptcy Code to sell substantially all of Chrysler’s assets to “New Chrysler” in less than 30 days.