There have been many reported cases in the bankruptcies of Mr and Mrs Brake (the “Brakes”) including the recent case of Patley Wood Farm LLP v Kicks [2023] EWCA Civ 901 where the Court of Appeal considered an application under s303 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the “IA 1986”) against a decision of the trustees in bankruptcy of the Brakes (the “Trustees”).
The Supreme Court’s judgment in BTI 2014 LLC v Sequana SA and ors[1] (“Sequana”) is a key decision on the law surrounding directors’ duties.
The High Court was required to consider the Supreme Court’s Sequana judgment in Hunt v Singh (below).
What did we learn from Sequana?
In R (on the application of Palmer) v Northern Derbyshire Magistrates' Court [2023] UKSC 38, the Supreme Court has ruled that an administrator appointed under the Insolvency Act 1986 is not an "officer" of the company.
This case considered this issue within the meaning of section 194 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (the TULRCA). As a result of the Supreme Court's decision, administrators will not be exposed to potential criminal liability for failing to notify the Secretary of State of collective redundancies.
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The Supreme Court recently considered whether administrators of a company can be prosecuted for a failure to provide notice to the Secretary of State, using form HR1, of proposed collective redundancies.
They found that for the purposes of interpreting the relevant section of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 ("TULRCA"), administrators were not an "officer" and so were not subject to the obligation to file an HR1. This decision, however, has the potential to impact much wider than the world of redundancies.
Recent news reports have highlighted that the number of corporate insolvencies has continued to rise during 2022 and 2023, with the retail sector being particularly affected. Many companies are struggling to meet the demands of repaying government support provided during lockdown, increased running costs and high wages coupled with lower demand due to the cost of living crisis.
In a welcome clarification for administrators, the UK Supreme Court in the recent case of R (on the application of Palmer) v Northern Derbyshire Magistrates’ Court[1], held that an administrator appointed under the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) is not an “officer” of the company for the purposes of section 194(3) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA).
The court has the power to challenge any decision of the officeholder in an insolvency process on application by a dissatisfied party. The ambit of that power depends upon the nature of the insolvency process but, broadly, the following categories of people will be entitled to apply:
Overview
- The UK Supreme Court issued a recent decision in R (on the application of Palmer) v Northern Derbyshire Magistrates Court and Another [2023] UKSC 38.
- Crucially, the Court determined that an administrator is not an officer of the company within the meaning of the phrase 'any director, manager, secretary or similar officer of the body corporate', for the purpose of section 194(3).
Contents
R (on the application of Palmer) v Northern Derbyshire Magistrates Court and Another [2023] UKSC 38
Background
In R (on the application of Palmer) (Appellant) v. Northern Derbyshire Magistrates Court and another (Respondents), the Supreme Court held that an administrator appointed under the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) is not an "officer" of the insolvent company under section 194(3) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA).