Overview
- The UK Supreme Court issued a recent decision in R (on the application of Palmer) v Northern Derbyshire Magistrates Court and Another [2023] UKSC 38.
- Crucially, the Court determined that an administrator is not an officer of the company within the meaning of the phrase 'any director, manager, secretary or similar officer of the body corporate', for the purpose of section 194(3).
Contents
R (on the application of Palmer) v Northern Derbyshire Magistrates Court and Another [2023] UKSC 38
Background
In R (on the application of Palmer) (Appellant) v. Northern Derbyshire Magistrates Court and another (Respondents), the Supreme Court held that an administrator appointed under the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) is not an "officer" of the insolvent company under section 194(3) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA).
R (ON THE APPLICATION OF PALMER) V NORTHERN DERBYSHIRE MAGISTRATES COURT AND ANOTHER [2023] UKSC 38
Insolvency practitioners will welcome the Supreme Court’s recent decision that an administrator of a company appointed under the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA) does not fall within the ambit of section 194(3) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992) (TULRCA) and therefore cannot be held personally liable under criminal law for the company’s failure to give notice to the Secretary of State in accordance with section 193 of TULRCA.
The Supreme Court has handed down a judgment which will be greeted with a collective sigh of relief from the insolvency world. In R (on the application of Palmer) v Northern Derbyshire Magistrates Court [2023] UKSC 38, the Supreme Court ruled that an administrator of a company is not an “officer” of that company.
In a judgment that will be welcomed by insolvency professionals, the Supreme Court has today confirmed that administrators cannot be personally criminally liable for failing to notify the Secretary of State about plans for collective redundancies. This judgment follows an appeal by Robert Palmer against a finding that he was criminally liable for his failure to submit form HR1 in his capacity as the joint administrator of West Coast Capital (USC) Limited (USC).
What is the obligation?
In the recent decision of FamilyMart China Holding Co v Ting Chuan (Cayman Islands) Holding Corporation [2023] UKPC 33 (FamilyMart),[1] the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (the Board) found that, although an arbitral tribunal does not have the power to determine whether it is just and equitable to wind up a company nor to make a winding u
In the recent case of Brake & Anor v Chedington Court Estate Limited [2023] UKSC 29, the Supreme Court has clarified the categories of persons who have standing to make a challenge to the conduct of a trustee in bankruptcy under s303 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the “Act”). The Supreme Court confirmed that its decision will also apply to creditors and others seeking to challenge the actions of a liquidator under s168(5) of the Act. The decision will be welcomed by practitioners.
Executive Summary
In a radical departure from settled case law, the English High Court has eroded the protections of English law creditors guaranteed by the Rule in Gibbs1 .
The Abu Dhabi Global Market (the “ADGM”) courts have recently handed down their decision in NMC Healthcare Limited & Others v Shetty & Others ([2024] ADGMCFI 0007). The decision deals with several important principles in relation to fraudulent/wrongful trading liabilities under ADGM law. Given the ADGM re-domiciliation (or continuation) regime, enabling companies incorporated elsewhere to be redomiciled to ADGM with relative ease, the decision is likely to be of interest beyond the borders of the ADGM.
"The law on 'knowing receipt' has perplexed judges and academics alike for several decades" – Lord Burrows (paragraph 99).