In 2008, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in Saulnier5 that a commercial fishing licence constitutes ‘property’ within the context of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) and the Nova Scotia PPSA6, thereby allowing the trustee in bankruptcy to seize the licence from the bankrupt.
The bankrupt’s trustee applied for a possession order of his home. The bankrupt unsuccessfully appealed his bankruptcy, the order in litigation that had led to his bankruptcy and the possession order, but he refused throughout to give up possession and applied for a committal order. The court found the bankrupt in contempt of court for failing to give possession and sentenced him to six months’ imprisonment.
The Insolvency Service has published its policy, which came into effect on 1 December 2010, on realising a bankrupt's principal residence where the Official Receiver (OR) is appointed as the trustee in bankruptcy.
The policy provides that the OR will not take any steps to market the bankrupt's interest in the property for a period of two years and three months from the date of the bankruptcy order. However, the OR can accept any unsolicited offer in relation to the property if it is in the best interest of creditors. After the expiry of the two years and three months:
A husband and wife jointly owned their property. In matrimonial proceedings, the husband was ordered to transfer his interest in the property to the wife. Following his bankruptcy, the husband’s trustee applied to set aside the property transfer on the basis that it had been made at an undervalue, and the wife had given no consideration in money or money’s worth within the meaning of s339 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The wife contended that the fact that she had foregone ancillary relief claims was capable of amounting to consideration.
A party cannot appeal a decision made in bankruptcy proceedings by reason only of a personal interest in the outcome. An economic interest is a pre-requisite.
This was confirmed by the court in Sands and another v Monem and another, in which the bankrupt had transferred the interest in his home to his wife before being made bankrupt. The transfer was made allegedly in order to settle a debt, although this was not reflected in the documentation. That transfer was successfully set aside as a preference by the bankrupt's trustee.
MB had been the secured tenant of a property in which she lived with B, and which she had bought at a substantial discount. The property was conveyed into the joint names of MB and B as joint tenants. Although MB’s mortgage company had insisted the property be in joint names, she claimed that the intention had always been that B would only have a minimal interest in it. He had made no contribution to the purchase price, mortgage repayments or household expenses. When MB had ascertained the effect of the joint tenancy, she gave notice of severance to B.
A recent decision of the Alberta Queen’s Bench1 has raised some questions about purchase-money security interest (“PMSI”) proceeds and cross-collateralization of assets secured by these types of security interests. It has been suggested that this decision is unique and establishes that using a PMSI as collateral for other indebtedness of the debtor is dangerous. But is this decision really so radical?
Facts:
The United States Supreme Court recently submitted to Congress an amendment to Bankruptcy Rule 2019 dealing with disclosure by groups of hedge funds and other distressed investors in reorganization cases. Unless Congress blocks its passage, which is unlikely, the amendment will become effective on Dec. 1, 2011.1 As shown below, the new rule streamlines and clarifies what had become a frequently litigated disclosure process.
Background
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on Feb. 10, 2010, that a corporate debtor’s pre-bankruptcy severance payments to its former chief executive officer (“CEO”) were fraudulent transfers. In re Transtexas Gas Corp., ____ F.3d _____, 2010 BL 28145 (5th Cir. 2/10/10). Because of its holding “that the payments were fraudulent under the Bankruptcy Code,” the court did “not consider other possible violations, including [the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] or [Bankruptcy Code] Section 547(b) [preferences].” Id. at *5.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held on Nov. 3, 2009, that a district court had improperly dismissed, on mootness grounds, an appeal from a bankruptcy court’s order confirming a reorganization plan. According to the Tenth Circuit, the appeal was reviewable because reversal of the plan confirmation order (1) would not unduly affect innocent third parties, and (2) would not undo any complex transactions.