In a recent order entered in In re SemCrude, L.P., Case No. 08-11525, the Delaware bankruptcy court (1) clarified the application of Bankruptcy Code section 503(b)(9) to creditors’ priority claims arising from the delivery of goods in the 20 days before a bankruptcy filing and (2) amended a previously entered procedures order to allow for the resolution of disputed “Twenty Day Claims” on their merits.
Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz held a chapter 7 debtor accountable for “actual fraud” despite the absence of a specific fraudulent misrepresentation. The Court’s expansive reading of section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code gives creditors a new weapon in their fight to attack the discharge of their debts.
On September 17, 2009 Judge Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued two orders that may significantly impact parties who held, or still currently hold, derivative contracts with Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (LBSF) or any of the other debtors in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy cases (the Debtors).
Desperate times call for desperate measures. It is not surprising then that a less than scrupulous debtor might be less than candid when disclosing assets and liabilities to a bankruptcy court. But what happens if an individual debtor is discovered to have concealed assets – possibly fraudulently or in bad faith – and then seeks to exercise his or her statutory right under the Bankruptcy Code to exempt all or a portion of the discovered assets from being available to satisfy creditors? Can a bankruptcy court in that circumstance look to the bad acts of the debtor as a basi
An opinion issued earlier this year by the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in In re SemCrude, L.P., et al. (Bankr. Del., No. 08-11525; January 9, 2009) may end much of the practice of so-called “triangular setoffs” by creditors in bankruptcy cases. The Court in SemCrude found that creditors violate section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code by setting off amounts among multiple debtors, even when exercising contractual assignment rights. This ruling is likely to have far-reaching impact given the dearth of case law on this fairly common contractual provision.
As we previewed last week, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently handed General Motors (“New GM”) an enormous victory that may end up shielding the company from up to $10 billion in successor liability claims.
During the bankruptcy cycle following the recession of 2001, numerous debtors – notably airlines such as US Airways and United Air Lines, Inc. – undertook “distress terminations” of their ERISA-qualified defined benefit pension plans, which are insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). The PBGC found itself holding large general unsecured claims arising from significant underfunding of pension plans insured by the PBGC as a result of these terminations. Efforts by the PBGC to obtain either administrative priority or secured status for these claims invariably failed.1
In December 2013, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code was applicable to Chapter 15 cases. In Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet), 737 F.3d 238 (2d Cir.
Summary
Following the US case of Morning Mist Holdings when a Court of Appeals decided that COMI had to be analysed on the date of the Chapter 15 case petition, we look again at the case of Kemsley where the US bankruptcy court held that COMI had to be analysed on the date of the filing of the UK bankruptcy. We consider whether this could have affected the outcome of the Kemsley case and look at the factors used by the English and US Courts to interpret an individual debtor’s COMI.
Background
Directors and Officers (“D&O”) liability policies, like many other liability policies, often have an exclusion that precludes coverage when one insured sues another insured. Coverage, however, can be restored under certain exceptions. One of those exceptions is the bankruptcy exception, which allows a bankruptcy trustee or comparable authority to sue on behalf of the estate against another insured like a director or officer.