The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has weighed in on the question of whether a secured creditor’s ability to credit bid—to offset the amount of the creditor’s debt against the purchase price of sale assets rather than bid in cash—is a right guaranteed by statute even in “cramdown” plans of reorganization conducted under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. On June 28, 2011, the court ruled in favor of secured creditors with its much anticipated decision in In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC (River Road).1

The United States Supreme Court recently ruled in Stern v. Marshall1 that a bankruptcy court lacks constitutional authority to render a final judgment on a bankruptcy estate’s counterclaim against a creditor based on state common law, despite an express statutory grant of jurisdiction. This ruling is the most significant decision regarding bankruptcy court jurisdiction since the Court’s 1982 decision in Northern Pipeline v. Marathon2 and it could significantly affect the administration of bankruptcy cases.

Root of the Constitutional Problem

On July 6, 2011 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's ("FDIC's") Board of Directors met in open session, voting unanimously to approve a final rule addressing the claims process and other aspects of the FDIC's orderly liquidation authority under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank").  The Board also discussed the FDIC's progress in preparing final rules with respect to both resolution planning under Dodd-Frank and the FDIC's own proposal, issued prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank, separately calling for certain large insured de

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held that redemptions of commercial paper made through the Depositary Trust Company (DTC) are entitled to the “safe harbor” protections afforded to settlement payments under Bankruptcy Code Section 546(e), and are, therefore, not preferential transfers, even though such payments were made prior to maturity.1 The Second Circuit is the first Circuit Court of Appeal to address the issue, which arises out of the Enron bankruptcy case.

Legal Framework

Since it was issued three years ago by the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, the Clear Channel decision (Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), 391 B.R. 25 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2008)) has been widely criticized as “an aberration in well-settled bankruptcy jurisprudence.” Before Clear Channel, conventional wisdom (and what most people perceived to be the law) supported the notion that a bankruptcy sale order that contained a good faith finding under Section 363(m) could not be disturbed on appeal.

At a time when municipalities face historic fiscal challenges, the Commonwealth budget for fiscal year 2012 temporarily deprives Pennsylvania’s third-class cities of a useful tool for negotiating with creditors.

The Bottom Line:

Back in the mists of time, a seller that had a valid reclamation claim but was denied the return of its goods was entitled to an administrative expense claim (a claim with a higher priority than a general unsecured claim and thus a better chance of getting paid) or a lien on the debtor’s assets. The 2005 amendment to § 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code changed all that by stripping away those alternative remedies.

Introduction

On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court ruled 5-4, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, that a Bankruptcy Judge lacked constitutional authority to issue a final ruling on state law counterclaims by a debtor against a claimant. This is the latest round of a well-known case involving the estate of former model Anna Nicole Smith and the estate of her late husband, wealthy oil magnate J. Howard Marshall.