The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on Aug. 16, 2011, affirmed the lower court’s decision authorizing reimbursement of expenses to qualified bidders for a reorganization debtor’s assets. In re Asarco, LLC, 2011 BL 213002 (5th Cir. Aug. 16, 2011). In the court’s view, the debtor provided “a compelling and sound business justification for the reimbursement authority.” Id. at *12.

Facts

The author examines a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that involved whether a contract was, or was not, an executory contract.

“[B]ankruptcy inevitably creates harsh results for some players,” explained the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on May 21, 2021, when it denied a film producer’s claim for contractual cure payments in In re Weinstein Company Holdings, LLC. 1

On June 28, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that secured creditors have a statutory right to credit bid1 their debt at an asset sale conducted under a "cramdown" plan. In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, ___ F.3d. ___, 2011 WL 2547615 (7th Cir. June 28, 2011).2 The Seventh Circuit's decision creates a split with recent decisions in the Third and Fifth Circuits regarding a lender's ability to credit bid its secured debt. See In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Pacific Lumber, Co., 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.

The Third Circuit recently held, in a case from the Energy Future Holdings bankruptcy, that a losing stalking horse bidder can provide sufficient value to the debtor’s estate to receive an administrative claim for a break-up fee and expenses. In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 990 F.3d 728, 748 (3rd Cir. 2021). This represents an expansive view of potential administrative claims related to those costs, providing bidders significant potential protections for their bids.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, on Dec. 6, 2010, summarily affirmed a bankruptcy court’s designation of a secured lender’s vote on a reorganization plan in a two-page order, effectively enabling the debtor to cram down the lender’s claim. In re DBSD North America, Inc., __ F.3d__, 2010 WL 4925878 (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 2010).1 As a result, the lender who bought all of the debtor’s senior first-lien secured debt at par will be paid only interest over a period of four years before its loan matures. SeeIn re DBSD North America, Inc., 419 B.R. 179, 207-08 (Bankr.

“[B]ankruptcy inevitably creates harsh results for some players,” explained the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on May 21, 2021, when it denied a film producer’s claim for contractual cure payments. In re Weinstein Company Holdings, LLC, 2021 WL 2023058, *9 (3d Cir. May 21, 2021).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held, in a split decision, on March 22, 2010, that secured creditors do not have a statutory right to credit bid1 their debt at an asset sale conducted under a “cramdown” reorganization plan. In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, et al., --- F.3d ----, 2010 WL 1006647 (3d Cir. March 22, 2010) (2-1).

On August 29, 2016, the Third Circuit released a precedential opinion (the “Opinion”) which opined that a “[redemption] premium, meant to give the lenders the interest yield they expect, [does not] fall away because the full principal amount is now due and the noteholders are barred from rescinding the acceleration of debt.” The Third Circuit’s Opinion is available here. This Opinion was issued in an appeal from a decision made in the Energy Future Holdings Bankruptcy Case No. 14-10979.

Summary

In an 11 page opinion published May 18, 2011, Judge Shannon ruled that, in the context of a motion to dismiss, the officer of a corporation, which is itself a contractor, is not also a contractor by virtue of her position within the corporation. Judge Shannon’s opinion is available here (the “Opinion”).

Background

On August 29, 2016, the Third Circuit released a precedential opinion (the “Opinion”) which opined on whether filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition could qualify as tortious interference under state law. The Third Circuit’s Opinion is available here. This Opinion was issued in Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XVII, LLC, Case No. 15-2622. The District Court had ruled that the tortious interference claim was preempted by § 303(i) of the Bankruptcy Code.