In a recent decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York found that the Statutory Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”) of Iridium, a failed Motorola spin-off venture, was unable to prove that Iridium was insolvent or had unreasonably small capital during the four-year period prior to commencement of its bankruptcy case.

On May 14, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld a ruling by the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey that the fair market value of a creditor’s collateral as of the plan’s confirmation date is the proper method of valuing a secured creditor’s claim pursuant to section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.  The Third Circuit also adopted a “burden-shifting framework,” finding that a secured creditor will bear the ultimate burden of proving the extent to which its claims are secured pursuant to section 506(a).

Background

On March 26, 2012, Judge Mary F. Walrath of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware refused to rule that, as a matter of law, payments made to satisfy a debtor’s obligations under a letter of credit constitute “settlement payments” protected from avoidance under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. EPLG I, LLC v. Citibank, National Association et al. (In re Qimonda Richmond, LLC, et al.), No. 09-10589, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1264 (Bankr.

On February 16, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that a discounted cash flow analysis constituted “a commercially reasonable determinant[] of value” for purposes of section 562(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code.1 In so doing, the court upheld the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware decision sustaining the objection of American Home Mortgage Holdings, Inc.

In the W.R. Grace bankruptcy, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently reaffirmed its prior rulings on the controversial issue of a bankruptcy court’s power to enjoin actions by third parties against non-debtors.1 Resting on prior precedent, the Third Circuit held that bankruptcy courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin third party actions that have no direct effect upon the bankruptcy estate.

On July 13, 2010, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit unanimously held that auto-parts supplier Visteon Corporation could not terminate health and life insurance benefits for approximately 2,100 retirees during its chapter 11 bankruptcy unless Visteon followed the specific requirements laid out in section 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code, even if Visteon would have had the unilateral right to terminate these benefits outside bankruptcy.1 The Court found that a debtor may terminate any retiree benefits in bankruptcy only if,inter alia, the debt

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed the District Court’s ruling in In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC.1 The Court allowed Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC to require all-cash bids for the asset sale under their proposed plan. This precluded secured creditors from credit bidding, as long as the plan provided those creditors with the “indubitable equivalent” of the value of their claims.

Introduction

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York recently addressed an objection to the debtor-in-possession financing approved by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in the bankruptcy of General Growth Properties.1 The District Court’s decision, which holds that reversal on appeal of an order approving DIP financing does not invalidate the financing or liens granted by the postpetition lenders, if provided in good faith also addresses both the timeliness of the appeal and the merits of the arguments raised therein, provides a detai

Introduction

Several recent bankruptcy decisions rendered in the Third Circuit address whether the disclosure requirements of Rule 2019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure apply to informal or “ad hoc” committees.1 Although these courts base their reasoning on the “plain meaning” of Rule 2019, their ultimate holdings are inconsistent and have generated renewed interest in this topic among lenders and the investing community. This article provides a brief summary of these recent decisions and examines their inconsistencies.