Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“WSRCPA”) represents Congress’ attempt to address companies considered “too big to fail.” The statute creates a new “orderly liquidation authority” (“OLA”), which allows the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) to seize control of a financial company1 whose imminent collapse is determined to threaten the financial system as a whole. Commencement of a receivership under the OLA would preempt any proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware has held that policy proceeds were not part of the insured entity’s bankruptcy estate because previous entity claims were dismissed with prejudice, it was highly speculative that the bankruptcy trustee would approve indemnification of directors and officers and the policy’s priority of payment provision provided that entity coverage was only available after payment of proceeds for direct coverage to insured persons. In re Downey Fin. Corp., 428 B.R. 595 (D. Del. Bankr. May 7, 2010).
The Bankruptcy Code treats insiders with increased scrutiny, from longer preference periods to rigorous equitable subordination principles, denial of chapter 7 trustee voting rights, disqualification in some cases of votes on a cram-down chapter 11 plan, and restrictions on postpetition key-employee compensation packages. The treatment of claims by insiders for prebankruptcy services is no exception to this general policy: section 502(b)(4) disallows insider claims for services to the extent the claim exceeds the "reasonable value" of such services.
Title II of the Act, designated "Orderly Liquidation Authority" – effective July 21, 2010 – establishes what is intended to be an orderly liquidation process for "financial companies" whose collapse or potential collapse are determined to constitute a risk to the financial system as a whole. Such systemically significant institutions would be liquidated under these new procedures, rather than being treated under existing bankruptcy laws. (The intent of Act is that most-failing financial companies will continue to be administered under existing bankruptcy laws.)
Introduction
Introduction
After months of negotiations and conferences among key legislators, President Obama signed into law a final version of regulatory reform legislation on July 21, 2010. More than 2,000 pages long, the “Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act” (the Act) provides new legal guidelines for both “financial companies” and non-financial companies and instructs federal agencies to develop a myriad of regulations to enforce the concepts provided in the Act.
A company facing a rash of tort lawsuits may try to use a dormant subsidiary’s bankruptcy as a tool to limit its exposure. That’s what Pfizer tried to do, and a New York bankruptcy judge sent them packing. This case is a warning to corporate parents that courts will not allow them to manipulate the process to use the bankruptcies of subsidiaries to further their own agendas. If you’re a creditor you can use this case as ammunition in reorganization disputes to show bad faith. Read on for a quick summary of what happened in the Pfizer case, and what you can learn from it.
Recently, the Chapter 7 Trustee (the "Trustee") in the HRP Myrtle Beach Holdings bankruptcy, filed several avoidance actions pursuant to sections 547, 548, and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code. The avoidance actions, filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, are before the Honorable Kevin J. Carey, Chief Judge of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court.
The next few years will see the “redevelopment” of the law in two critical areas involving bank failures where the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-tion (“FDIC”) is appointed receiver: (i) the relative rights and claims of creditors of a bank or savings and loan holding company, including the FDIC; and (ii) D&O and professional liability. Significant decisions are be-ginning to be issued with regard to the former.