Introduction

This article addresses bankruptcy issues commonly arising in connection with intercreditor agreements, and is intended to provide a general examination of provisions that relate specifically to bankruptcy or other insolvency proceedings. By reviewing variations of these provisions that have appeared in negotiated second lien financings, the discussion provides a checklist that will be useful at the front end of deals of this kind.

Although courts are generally reluctant to equitably subordinate claims of non-insiders, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana recently did just that to the claims of a non-insider lender based on overreaching and self-serving conduct in Credit Suisse v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In Re Yellowstone Mt. Club, LLC), Case No. 08-61570-11, Adv. No. 09-00014 (Bankr. D. Mont. May 13, 2009).

During the bankruptcy cycle following the recession of 2001, numerous debtors – notably airlines such as US Airways and United Air Lines, Inc. – undertook “distress terminations” of their ERISA-qualified defined benefit pension plans, which are insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). The PBGC found itself holding large general unsecured claims arising from significant underfunding of pension plans insured by the PBGC as a result of these terminations. Efforts by the PBGC to obtain either administrative priority or secured status for these claims invariably failed.1

On May 31, 2009, approximately 30 days after Chrysler Group LLC and affiliated debtors filed for bankruptcy relief, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York authorized the sale of substantially all of Chrysler’s assets to “New Chrysler” – an entity formed by Chrysler and Fiat Automobiles SpA and initially majority-owned by Chrysler’s Voluntary Employees’ Beneficiary Association (VEBA) – free and clear of liens, claims and encumbrances under section 363 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the Fiat Transaction).

In the fourth quarter of 2008, global credit markets were virtually frozen, leading many distressed businesses and their constituents to take measures to avoid bankruptcy filings at almost all costs. Without access to debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing, bankruptcy most often results in liquidation – and with lenders reluctant to provide new money, even in exchange for superpriority and/or priming liens, total collapse became an increasingly common result.

An opinion issued earlier this year by the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in In re SemCrude, L.P., et al. (Bankr. Del., No. 08-11525; January 9, 2009) may end much of the practice of so-called “triangular setoffs” by creditors in bankruptcy cases. The Court in SemCrude found that creditors violate section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code by setting off amounts among multiple debtors, even when exercising contractual assignment rights. This ruling is likely to have far-reaching impact given the dearth of case law on this fairly common contractual provision.

On September 17, 2009 Judge Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued two orders that may significantly impact parties who held, or still currently hold, derivative contracts with Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (LBSF) or any of the other debtors in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy cases (the Debtors).

The US government’s foray into restructuring the ailing US automotive industry has been widely reported in the media and represents the most substantial federal intervention in the private business sector since the Great Depression. In Chrysler’s case, the government took the unprecedented step of orchestrating a “surgical” Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing with the primary goal of utilizing the provisions of Section 363 of the US Bankruptcy Code to sell substantially all of Chrysler’s assets to “New Chrysler” in less than 30 days.

The October 15, 2009 decision of the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in In re Pillowtex opens the door for creditors in the Third Circuit to increase their "new value" preference defense under the "subsequent advance" approach.In re Pillowtex, No. 03-12339 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Oct. 15, 2009).

A trustee’s power to avoid preference payments is circumscribed by the statutory defenses set forth in section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. The "subsequent new value" defense set forth in section 547(c)(4) has three well-established elements:

In a recent order entered in In re SemCrude, L.P., Case No. 08-11525, the Delaware bankruptcy court (1) clarified the application of Bankruptcy Code section 503(b)(9) to creditors’ priority claims arising from the delivery of goods in the 20 days before a bankruptcy filing and (2) amended a previously entered procedures order to allow for the resolution of disputed “Twenty Day Claims” on their merits.