“Bad news comes in threes.” “Third time’s the charm.” “Three strikes and you’re out.”

One of these three adages may come to characterize the outcome of a case of significant import argued before the US Supreme Court this week. The Supreme Court heard arguments on Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif. The case is the third in a trilogy including Stern v. Marshall and Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, which examine the scope of the constitutional exercise of judicial power by bankruptcy courts.

Introduction to CVAs

A company voluntary arrangement (“CVA”) is a tool available to a company in financial difficulty to restructure its debts. In contrast to other insolvency procedures, the directors remain in control of the business which continues to operate broadly as normal, subject to the supervision of an insolvency practitioner (“the Supervisor”).

The Spanish Supreme Court has established the legalconcept of insolvency as an objective requirement forthe Declaration of Insolvency pursuant to Section 2.1 ofthe bankruptcy Act by virtue of the decision taken by the Court on April 1, 2014.

The case held that a judge was right to strike out a claim brought by a liquidator under sections 238 and 241 of the Insolvency Act 1986, as the transactions alleged to have been made at an undervalue were not transactions entered into by the company.

Comment

The Company Court of Alicante, Nº 1, made, in its judgment dated July 20th, 2012, a useful analysis on the different decisions part of the case law in regards to the recognition of pledgesof future receivables and their classification as privileged credit in cases of bankruptcy proceedings, being a very commonly practiced consideration.

Following the latest reform of the Bankruptcy Act, the Spanish Tax Authorities have established a mechanism to ensure the collection of the applicable VAT in the acquisition of property from companies declared bankrupt.

Until 1 January 2012, Article 84 of the VAT Act 37/1992, when regulating the reversal cases of the taxpayer liable for this tax, no reference is made to companies declared bankrupt and the cases of their goods being acquired. However, this situation has changed since 1 January 2012.

A popular line of thinking among bankruptcy practitioners and commentators holds that substantive consolidation – the combining of assets and liabilities of a debtor and another debtor or non-debtor entity to satisfy creditor claims against both entities ratably from the resulting pool – is an equitable remedy of judicial invention with no specific foundation in the Bankruptcy Code.

The summer months are upon us, and developments in insolvency law and practice continue apace. Since our Spring issue the courts have pronounced in a number of interesting cases. At the time of writing, the World Cup is underway – it would perhaps be remiss not to have some football flavour in this article, and so some observations on the plight of Portsmouth FC are appropriate (though saved till the end).

Successive notices of intention to appoint administrators: more than one moratorium?

On the 12 November 2009, the OFT launched a market study into corporate insolvency. The investigation was prompted by concerns raised with the Government and the Insolvency Service, and also following a recent World Bank report which showed that the costs of closing a business in the UK are higher than in other countries.

During the bankruptcy cycle following the recession of 2001, numerous debtors – notably airlines such as US Airways and United Air Lines, Inc. – undertook “distress terminations” of their ERISA-qualified defined benefit pension plans, which are insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). The PBGC found itself holding large general unsecured claims arising from significant underfunding of pension plans insured by the PBGC as a result of these terminations. Efforts by the PBGC to obtain either administrative priority or secured status for these claims invariably failed.1