On August 4, 2015, we posted: “Equitable Mootness In The Third Circuit: Dead Or Alive?”, which analyzed the Third Circuit’s opinion in In re One2One Communications.   The post predicted that Judge Krause’s concurrence would likely result in further opinions on equitable mootness.  Less than a month later we have such an opinion.  InAurelius v. Tribune, 14-3332 (3d Cir.

Did you know that if a company is listed on the Interim Permission Consumer Credit Register that the directors of the company need the written consent of the FCA before they can file a notice of intention to appoint administrators (“NOI”), and failure to obtain FCA consent renders any subsequent appointment invalid?

Most businesses that; offer goods or services on credit, lend money to consumers, or provide debt solutions and advice to consumers will be carrying out consumer credit activities, and may well have an interim permission and be listed on the Consumer Credit Register.

In the ongoing RadioShack (RS) bankruptcy case, a Delaware bankruptcy court took a first look at the enforceability of Agreements Among Lenders (AALs), the contracts governing the often-times complicated relationships among lenders with different risk and yield appetites yet which reside in one credit agreement.  While the RS bankruptcy court provided long-awaited guidance on some aspects of AALs in its recent oral ruling, much has been left to the continued imaginations of those who dream of buy-out rights, waivers of voting rights and the other power-shifting mechanisms in AALs.

People are generally familiar with the concept that a party’s right to appeal applies to those orders that are “final.” A “final” order is one that resolves or disposes of the disputes between the parties. While an interlocutory order may be appealable at the discretion of the appellate court, the aggrieved party has no absolute right to appeal an order that is not “final.”

In the latest decision on COMI (Northsea Base Investment Limited & ors [2015] EWHC 121 (Ch)), the English Court had to determine the centre of main interest for a  group of companies registered in Cyprus, but where the operations of the companies were managed by a shipping agent in London.

Bankruptcy Judge Chris Klein recently issued his formal confirmation opinion in Stockton’s Chapter 9 bankruptcy case. While there were no real surprises, the opinion makes for entertaining reading given the Court’s more than serious conclusion that:

In December 2013, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code was applicable to Chapter 15 cases.  In Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet), 737 F.3d 238 (2d Cir.

On December 1, 2014, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2014(FIBA).  The legislation passed on a voice vote and is supported by the major Wall Street banks.

Last Friday, the Sixth Circuit postponed oral argument in some of the pending cases in the appeal from the bankruptcy judge’s decision that Detroit was entitled to creditor protection under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and could try to alter the terms of workers’ pensions. The postponement was apparently granted to allow various pension groups to settle with the city.

The Administrators of a group of companies put their proposals before the creditors who failed to approve the proposals. Indeed, they failed to vote at all. The Administrators applied for the proposals to be approved by the Court. It was held that such approval was not required unless  the proposals were actively opposed by creditors. In the absence of such approval, the judge considered that the administrators have the power to act in their own discretion. The judge also used the case to comment on the standard form of proposals used by most insolvency practitioners.