Ever since the establishment of the U.K. Pensions Regulator (the "Regulator") by the U.K. Pensions Act 2004 (the "Act"), the Regulator's exercise of its authority has been of major importance to the U.K.'s restructuring and rescue business. The first judicial review of the Regulator's powers, however, hints that some of the procedures it has adopted may be curbed in the future.

The Pensions Regulator and the Restructuring Environment

The ability of a creditor whose claim is “impaired” to vote on a chapter 11 plan is one of the most important rights conferred on creditors under the Bankruptcy Code. The voting process is an indispensable aspect of safeguards built into the statute designed to ensure that any plan ultimately confirmed by the bankruptcy court meets with the approval of requisite majorities of a debtor’s creditors and shareholders and satisfies certain minimum standards of fairness.

As part of an intended comprehensive amendment of German insolvency law, the German Federal Ministry of Justice has prepared a draft of a new law to facilitate the reorganization of enterprises (“Reorganization Facilitation Act”). The new law will curtail the rights of shareholders of insolvent companies and allow capital measures and other corporate measures to be taken in the insolvency of a company without the participation of the shareholders. The new regulation is of interest to investors because it will significantly simplify the purchase of the shares of an insolvent company.

The implementation of restrictions on stock and/or claims trading has become almost routine in large chapter 11 cases involving public companies on the basis that such restrictions are vital to prevent forfeiture of favorable tax attributes that can be triggered by a change in control. Continued reliance on stock trading injunctions as a means of preserving net operating loss carry forwards, however, may be problematic, after the controversial ruling handed down in 2005 by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in In re UAL Corp.

Preservation of favorable tax attributes, such as net operating losses that might otherwise be forfeited under applicable nonbankruptcy law, is an important component of a business debtor's chapter 11 strategy. However, if the principal purpose of a chapter 11 plan is to avoid paying taxes, rather than to effect a reorganization or the orderly liquidation of the debtor, the Bankruptcy Code contains a number of tools that can be wielded to thwart confirmation of the plan.

A debtor’s exclusive right to formulate and solicit acceptances for a plan of reorganization during the initial stages of a chapter 11 case is one of the most important benefits conferred under the Bankruptcy Code as a means of facilitating the successful restructuring of an ailing enterprise. By giving a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession time to devise a solution to balance sheet and operational problems without being burdened by the competing agendas of other stakeholders in the bankruptcy case, exclusivity levels the playing field, at least temporarily.

The recent restructuring of Autodis, a French car parts company, is a perfect illustration of the positive consequences of the reform of the French bankruptcy code in effect since February 15, 2009. The combined use of the French conciliation procedure for the operating company and the French safeguard procedures for the holding companies were agreed upon between the debtor and its creditors pursuant to the first pre-pack agreement executed in France.

Background

It is not surprising that within an economic outlook which seems permanently set to "gloomy" many companies are having to think about reorganising their operations or restructuring their holding structures This article highlights some of the tax and other considerations which must be borne in mind when considering such reorganisations or restructurings with reference to some recent (and less recent) cases and changes in the law and points which have come to the fore in the current climate.

Recapitalisations

Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides a mechanism designed to preserve the creditor/shareholder risk allocation paradigm by categorically subordinating most types of claims asserted against a debtor by equity holders in respect of their equity holdings. However, courts do not always agree on the scope of this provision in undertaking to implement its underlying policy objectives. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this issue in In re Lehman Brothers Inc., 2014 BL 21201 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014).

When the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided Thabault v. Chait, 541 F.3d 512 (3d Cir. 2008), in September 2008, it was the most significant accounting malpractice decision of last year and perhaps the most significant damages case in the last 20 years. Why? Accounting malpractice cases are filled with pitfalls for unsuspecting plaintiffs. Moreover, accounting firms tend to settle cases in which the plaintiffs survive motions predicated on tried-and-true legal defenses and factual hurdles. The result is that few auditing malpractice cases are tried.