The California Court of Appeal recently rejected the argument that directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to the company's creditors when the company is in the so-called "zone of insolvency," or is even clearly insolvent. In Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. John Boyle, et al., 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 875 (Cal. Ct. App. 6th Dist. Oct. 29, 2009), the California court expounded that "there is no broad, paramount fiduciary duty of due care or loyalty that directors of an insolvent corporation owe the corporation's creditors solely because of a state of insolvency." Id. at 893-94.
Title II of the Act, designated "Orderly Liquidation Authority" – effective July 21, 2010 – establishes what is intended to be an orderly liquidation process for "financial companies" whose collapse or potential collapse are determined to constitute a risk to the financial system as a whole. Such systemically significant institutions would be liquidated under these new procedures, rather than being treated under existing bankruptcy laws. (The intent of Act is that most-failing financial companies will continue to be administered under existing bankruptcy laws.)
The Washington LLC Act prohibits an insolvent LLC from making a distribution to a member. RCW 25.15.235(1). Either type of insolvency will do – the LLC is unable to pay its debts as they come due in the usual course of business, or the LLC’s liabilities exceed the fair value of its assets.
The FDIC is currently responding to one of the worst financial crises in the history of the nation’s banking system. Sheila Bair, Chairman of the FDIC, expects that 2010 “will be the high water mark for the banking crisis.”1 Just over the last two years, 268 banks have failed in the United States, which is nearly ten times the number of failed banks during the prior eight-year period.2
On September 30th, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the bankruptcy trustee's lawsuit against Deloitte & Touche, the debtor's former auditor. The trustee alleged that Deloitte negligently failed to uncover and report unsound related-party transactions by the debtor's sole shareholder and CEO, and aided and abetted the CEO's breach of his fiduciary duty to the debtor. Affirming dismissal, the Court held the trustee failed to allege reliance upon Deloitte's audits and the statute of limitations bars the aiding and abetting claim.
Full text of the Court's opinion
In a 7-0 decision, the Ohio Supreme Court in Hudson v. Petrosurance, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-4505, held that the Ohio's Liquidation Act does not authorize the Superintendent of Insurance to pay interest to an insurer’s creditors and other preferred claimants on allowed claims before paying the funds remaining in the insolvent estate to the insurer's shareholders.
Straining under a debt burden in excess of $1 billion, TerreStar Networks filed a petition for Chapter 11 protection with a New York bankruptcy court on Tuesday. Known formerly as Motient Corp., TerreStar is in the midst of deploying a hybrid terrestrial/mobile satellite network that would serve rural and other hard-to-reach areas in the U.S.
In this opinion, the Court of Chancery granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s derivative claims against the defendants for breach of fiduciary duties, holding that, under Section 18-1002 of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (the “LLC Act”), creditors of an insolvent LLC lack standing to sue derivatively.
Creditors of insolvent Delaware corporations have recourse against corporate directors and officers whose disloyal or self-dealing conduct reduces the corporation’s assets available for distribution. Delaware courts have held that directors and officers of insolvent corporations owe fiduciary duties to creditors as the principal stakeholders in the remaining corporate assets. Where those duties are breached, creditors have standing to bring actions derivatively on behalf of the corporation for damages to the corporation. However, in a recent decision by Vice Chancellor J.
The current cycle of Chapter 11 corporate bankruptcies involves many cases where the debtor seeks to achieve a balance-sheet restructuring by converting debt into equity. When consensus cannot be achieved, junior stakeholders (i.e., second lien creditors, unsecured creditors and/or equity) will often contest plan confirmation on the grounds that the proposed plan provides more than 100% recovery to the senior creditors. Valuation plays the central role in these cases.