The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware has ruled that a creditor cannot effect a “triangular” setoff of the amounts owed between it and three affiliated debtors, despite pre-petition contracts that expressly contemplated multiparty setoff. In re SemCrude, L.P., Case No. 08-11525 (BLS), 2009 WL 68873 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 9, 2009). The Court relied principally on the plain language of section 553(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code, which limits setoff to mutual obligations between a debtor and a single nondebtor.

In March 2008, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided In re Airadigm Communications, Inc. (Airadigm Communications, Inc. v. FCC),1 a case that built upon the Supreme Court’s decision in FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications, Inc (“NextWave”).2 In NextWave, the Supreme Court held that the FCC’s participation in a bankruptcy proceeding is subject to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

In Mission Product Holdings, the Supreme Court Endorses “Rejection-as-Breach” Rule and Interprets Broadly the Contract Rights that Survive Rejection

In the well-publicized opinion of In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC et al., 599 F. 3d 298 (3rd Cir. 2010), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, agreeing with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,1 held that Section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code)2 is unambiguous and is to be read in the disjunctive, thus allowing a proponent of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization to use the "cram down" power under subsection (iii) of that Section without allowing a secured creditor to credit bid on a sale proposed as part of the plan.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed in In re XMH Corp., 647 F. 3d 690 (7th Cir. 2011), whether or not trademark licenses are assignable in bankruptcy proceedings. In its ruling, the Court held that a trademark license may not be assigned by a licensee in a bankruptcy proceeding unless there is an express provision in the contract permitting assignment by the licensee.

A super-priority debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) lender with a lien on all of the debtor’s assets has no “better claim” to a Chapter 11’s debtor’s leased property than the lessor, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on Jan. 11, 2018.Banco Panamericano, Inc. v. City of Peoria, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 738, *12 (7th Cir. Jan. 11, 2018). According to the court, the “lease between [the debtor] and [the lessor] gave [the debtor] no post-termination property interest” in “installations or structures” on the debtor’s property.Id.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held on May 5, 2009, that a group of secured lenders were fully secured and “entitled to a full recovery” from the debtor despite the bankruptcy court’s improper valuation of the collateral (improved airport terminal space) securing the lenders’ underlying $60 million loan. In re United Airlines, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 9648 (7th Cir. 5/5/09) (Easterbrook, Ch. J.). The lower courts had valued the lenders’ collateral at $35 million, leaving them with a $25 million unsecured claim.

A defendant bank (“Bank”) in a fraudulent transfer suit “could not prove” its “good faith” defense for loan repayments it received after its “investigator discovered [the] fraudulent past” of the Ponzi scheme debtor’s principal but “failed to disclose that past to [the Bank’s account] manager,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on Feb. 8, 2017. Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2248, *28 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2017).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on March 25, 2009, that a bankruptcy court had improperly surcharged property in the hands of a credit bidding asset buyer with the expenses of the judicial sale. In re Skuna River Lumber, LLC, __F.3d ___, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 6175 (5th Cir. 3/25/09). Explaining that the “bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to take such action,” the Fifth Circuit also vacated the district court’s improper ruling that the bankruptcy judge could enter a personal judgment against the asset buyer. Id., at *9.  

Facts

A corporation’s asset sale “was structured [by its insiders] so as to fraudulently transfer assets in order to avoid paying [a major creditor] what it was owed,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on March 22, 2016. Continental Casualty Co. v. Symons, 2016 WL 1118566, at *6 (7th Cir., March 22, 2016).