The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware has ruled that a creditor cannot effect a “triangular” setoff of the amounts owed between it and three affiliated debtors, despite pre-petition contracts that expressly contemplated multiparty setoff. In re SemCrude, L.P., Case No. 08-11525 (BLS), 2009 WL 68873 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 9, 2009). The Court relied principally on the plain language of section 553(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code, which limits setoff to mutual obligations between a debtor and a single nondebtor.
In March 2008, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided In re Airadigm Communications, Inc. (Airadigm Communications, Inc. v. FCC),1 a case that built upon the Supreme Court’s decision in FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications, Inc (“NextWave”).2 In NextWave, the Supreme Court held that the FCC’s participation in a bankruptcy proceeding is subject to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
In Mission Product Holdings, the Supreme Court Endorses “Rejection-as-Breach” Rule and Interprets Broadly the Contract Rights that Survive Rejection
In the well-publicized opinion of In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC et al., 599 F. 3d 298 (3rd Cir. 2010), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, agreeing with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,1 held that Section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code)2 is unambiguous and is to be read in the disjunctive, thus allowing a proponent of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization to use the "cram down" power under subsection (iii) of that Section without allowing a secured creditor to credit bid on a sale proposed as part of the plan.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed in In re XMH Corp., 647 F. 3d 690 (7th Cir. 2011), whether or not trademark licenses are assignable in bankruptcy proceedings. In its ruling, the Court held that a trademark license may not be assigned by a licensee in a bankruptcy proceeding unless there is an express provision in the contract permitting assignment by the licensee.
A “bank [making a secured rescue loan] had information that should have created the requisite suspicion … to conduct a diligent search for possible dirt” — i.e., whether the debtor had the right to pledge $312 million of customer securities, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on Jan. 8, 2016.In re Sentinel Management Group, Inc., 2016 WL 98601, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 8, 2016) [“Sentinel V”]. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court, voided the defendant bank’s lien as a fraudulent transfer, and rejected the bank’s good faith defense.
A “bankruptcy court has discretion to award the [bankruptcy] trustee the actual [fraudulently transferred] property or its pre-transfer value,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on Oct. 23, 2015. Hebenstreit v. Kaur, 2015 WL 6445461, at *2 (7th Cir. Oct. 23, 2015).
So-called “red flags” were not “sufficient to impose a duty on [a gambling casino (‘Casino’)] to investigate” a Chapter 11 debtor’s pre-bankruptcy fraudulent transfers to its insiders who gambled at the Casino, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on Oct. 13, 2015. In re Equipment Acquisition Resources, Inc., 2015 WL 5936354, at *6 (7th Cir. Oct. 13, 2015).
The United States Supreme Court, on July 1, 2014, granted a petition for certiorari in an important Seventh Circuit case limiting the power of bankruptcy courts to decide property disputes. Wellness International Network, Ltd. et al. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2013). The Seventh Circuit had held last year that the bankruptcy court lacked the constitutional authority to determine whether purported trust assets were property of the debtor’s estate.
“Good-faith purchasers enjoy strong protection under [Bankruptcy Code (“Code”)] § 363(m),” but the silent asset buyer (“B”) with “actual and constructive knowledge of a competing interest” lacks “good faith,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on April 4, 2022. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. (“ADM”) v. Country Visions Cooperative, 2022 WL 998984 (7th Cir. Apr. 4, 2022).