Summary

This briefing sets out the key French corporate income tax issues in respect of debt restructurings. In summary, debtors and creditors may be faced with material tax consequences in case of a debt waiver, debt transfer, conversion of debt into equity or debt buy-back, so that such operations may require an appropriate structuring in order to mitigate potential tax issues.

Introduction  

This briefing summarises key French tax points relating to restructuring of indebtedness.  

Introduction

The High Court1 in England has confirmed the validity under English law of contractual provisions common in structured finance transactions which subordinate payments to a swap counterparty in circumstances where the swap counterparty has defaulted on its obligations under the terms of the relevant swap agreement.

The Judgment

Parties

As the Madoff Securities and Stanford Financial schemes have unraveled in recent months, financial industry participants have had to scrutinize closely their involvement with these entities. A key issue in each of these cases will be the extent to which the trustee (or similar representative) can “claw back” payments made as part of the Ponzi and related fraudulent schemes. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently considered similar facts in Bayou Accredited Fund, LLC v. Redwood Growth Partners, L.P.

Historically, the United Kingdom has not had a specialised bankruptcy regime for dealing with the failures of financial institutions. Rather, these were handled under the same rules that applied to ordinary corporations.

Introduction

In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Moran Towing Corp. (In re Bethlehem Steel Corp.),1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that preferential transfer claims were not arbitrable. The Court reasoned that because the avoidance powers did not belong to the debtor, but rather were creditor claims that could only be brought by a trustee or debtor-in-possession, they were not subject to the arbitration clauses in contracts to which the creditors were not parties.

The Dispute and the Arbitration Clauses

September 21, 2008 Following a week of unprecedented market upheaval, players in financial contracts got some reassurance from the bankruptcy judge presiding over the liquidation of broker/dealer Lehman Brothers Inc. (“LBI”) and the sale of a portion of its assets to Barclays Capital Inc. (“BCI”).

On May 23, 2008, in American Home Mortgage Investment Corp. v. Lehman Bros. Inc.(In re American Home Mortgage Corp.),1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware ruled that BBB-rated mortgagebacked notes are eligible for the Bankruptcy Code’s repurchase agreement safe harbor as “interests in mortgage loans”.

Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that claims for “damages arising from the purchase or sale of . . . a security” of the debtor or an affiliate of the debtor are subordinated to any claims not based on stock. 11 U.S.C. § 510(b). Because there is rarely enough value in a bankrupt company to satisfy all claims, a determination that a particular claim is subject to mandatory subordination under section 510(b) means that, as a practical matter, the claim is unlikely to receive any distribution from the estate.

In a May 23, 2008 decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware ruled that BBB-rated mortgage-backed notes are eligible for the Bankruptcy Code's repurchase agreement safe harbor as “interests in mortgage loans”. The court also held that a repurchase agreement constituted a sale, as opposed to a financing governed by UCC Article 9 -- the first decision on this topic since the financial contract safe harbors were expanded under the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code.