Introduction

On 16 December 2010, HM Treasury published a revised draft of the Financial Markets and Insolvency (Settlement Finality and Financial Collateral Arrangements) (Amendment) Regulations 2010 (SI 2010/2993) (the “Amending Regulations”).  

Our October 2010 DechertOnPoint “FDIC Begins Action on Its Super-Resolution Rules for Covered Financial Companies” discussed how systemi-cally significant non-bank financial companies (“covered financial compa-nies”) may find themselves in unknown territory if the FDIC is appointed re-ceiver for them.

The new company shareholders, who have accessed ownership of the securities by ordinary purchase or by enforcement of a pledge of securities, must beware above all of the hitherto dormant claims of former shareholders and directors.

The legal effect of “limited recourse” arrangements have been thrown into fresh doubt by a first instance decision of the respected Mr Justice David Richards in the case of Arm Asset Backed Securities S.A. [2013] EWHC 3351.

This decision is relevant to the following common financing arrangements.

Non-U.S. companies in the process of restructuring debt that includes one or more series of U.S. bonds must ensure that their restructuring plan and any securities issued as part of such plan comply with the requirements of U.S. securities law, in particular the registration requirements of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"). 

The first appeal ruling from the newly formed UK Supreme Court concerned the construction of a clause setting out the distribution of assets in a collapsed structured investment vehicle (“SIV”). For the creditors attempting to salvage the remains of the SIV, and onlookers in similar situations, the judicial process has been a rollercoaster ride which has left them reeling.

Recent changes in Peruvian insolvency laws1 will now allow financial institutions and insurance company counterparties to close-out and net obligations under derivatives and repurchase agreements with Peruvian financial institutions or insurance companies which become subject to bankruptcy proceedings.

Debt-for-debt exchanges are not new, but are worth revisiting given the current economic climate. Furthermore, the recently enacted "Stimulus Act"1 provides some temporary relief to debtors from potentially harsh tax consequences of restructuring. The following discussion is relevant to issuers (also referred to as debtors) or holders (also referred to as creditors) of debt who are "US persons" (as defined in the US Internal Revenue Code).2

In order to illustrate some of the key US federal income tax consequences of a debt-for-debt exchange, consider the following example:

In Motorola, Inc. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007), the Second Circuit held that the most important factor for a bankruptcy court to consider in approving a pre-plan settlement pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 is whether the settlement’s distribution scheme complies with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme. Prior to this ruling, courts in the Second Circuit generally considered the following factors when approving settlement agreements: