An undersecured mortgagee’s “release of [its entire underlying claim] was value obtained ‘in exchange for’ the [pre-bankruptcy] sale of the [debtor’s] property,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on Dec. 6, 2016. In re Expert South Tulsa LLC, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21704, at *11 (10th Cir. Dec. 6, 2016). The Tenth Circuit flatly rejected the debtor’s attempt “to set aside as a fraudulent transfer its own sale of real estate that was encumbered by a mortgage far exceeding the sale price.” Id. at *1.

“Reasonably equivalent value” as a defense to a fraudulent transfer suit “can be satisfied with evidence that the transferee (1) fully performed under a lawful, arm’s-length contract for fair market value, (2) provided consideration that had objective value at the time of the transaction, and (3) made the exchange in the ordinary course of the transferee’s business,” held the Supreme Court of Texas on April 1, 2016, in response to a certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Janvey v. Golf Channel, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2016 WL 1268188, at *2 (Tex.

A “bankruptcy court has discretion to award the [bankruptcy] trustee the actual [fraudulently transferred] property or its pre-transfer value,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on Oct. 23, 2015. Hebenstreit v. Kaur, 2015 WL 6445461, at *2 (7th Cir. Oct. 23, 2015).

The claim of an insider lender (“L”) who invested “in a venture with substantial risk” and who loaned it additional funds on a secured basis to salvage its business should not be recharacterized as equity or subordinated on equitable grounds, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on June 12, 2015. In re Alternate Fuels, Inc., 2015 WL 3635366 (10th Cir. June 12, 2015) (2-1) (“AFI”).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on Oct. 16, 2014, held that a “good faith transferee” in a fraudulent transfer suit “is entitled” to keep what it received “only to the extent” it gave “value.” Williams v. FDIC (In re Positive Health Management), 2014 WL 5293705, at *8 (5th Cir. Oct. 16, 2014). Reversing in part the district and bankruptcy courts, the Fifth Circuit narrowed their holding that the debtor had “received reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the debtor’s cash transfers.” Id. at *1-2.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, on March 19, 2014, held that a corrupt debtor’s pre-bankruptcy cash transfer to a commodity broker was a “settlement payment” made “in connection with a securities contract,” thus falling “within [Bankruptcy Code] §546(e)’s safe harbor” and insulating the transfer from the trustee’s preference claim. Grede v. FCStone, LLC (In re Sentinel Management Group, Inc.), 2014 WL 1041736, *7 (7th Cir. Mar. 19, 2014).

The Ninth Circuit held on April 30, 2013 that a bankruptcy court “has the authority to determine whether a transaction creates a debt or an equity interest for purposes of [Bankruptcy Code] § 548, and that a transaction creates a debt if it creates a ‘right to payment’ under state law.” In re Fitness Holdings International, Inc., 2013 WL 1800000, *1 (9th Cir. April 30, 2013). The court agreed with five other circuits, but explicitly followed the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit’s recent In re Lothian Oil, Inc. decision. 650 F.3d 539, 543-44 (5th Cir.

Chapter 11 creditors’ committees and debtors continue to challenge lenders’ prepayment premiums, commitment fees and post-bankruptcy interest claims in reorganization cases. Nevertheless, courts regularly reject these challenges in well-reasoned decisions.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, overseeing the bankruptcy cases of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI”) and its affiliated debtors (collectively, the “Debtors”), entered an order on Aug.

A New York bankruptcy judge held on October 4, 2010, that second lien lenders could object to a debtor’s bid procedures approved by the first lien lenders despite the terms of an intercreditor agreement inIn re Boston Generating, LLC, No. 10-14419 (SCC) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2010).1 The intercreditor agreement provided the first lien lenders with the “exclusive right to…make determinations regarding the…sale” of the collateral. According to the court, however, the agreement did not expressly preclude the second lien lenders from objecting to bid procedures.