Insider creditors “waived [the] right to charge default interest on” their claims and “failed to prove” their claim for non-default interest, held the U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Tenth Circuit (“BAP”) on Nov. 6, 2015. In re Autterson, 2015 WL 6789168, at *4 (10th Cir. BAP, Nov. 6, 2015).

On 31 July 2015, the English High Court delivered its judgments in the ‘Waterfall IIA’ and ‘Waterfall IIB’ cases. The decisions are important to stakeholders in determining key questions about how, following payment in 2014 of all the provable claims, the estimated £7.39-billion surplus (the ‘Surplus’) in Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) (‘LBIE’) will be shared amongst them. For others, the decisions may be of general interest in probing some rarely aired legal issues relating to the lower levels of the insolvency payment waterfall.

Following the Dec. 8 publication by the American Bankruptcy Institute (“ABI”) Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 of a report (the “Report”) recommending changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”),[1] we continue to analyze the proposals contained in the ABI’s 400-page Report. One proposal we wanted to immediately highlight would, if adopted, significantly increase the risk profile for secured lenders.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, on April 27, 2014, issued a decision directing the bankruptcy court to dismiss fraudulent transfer complaints brought by the Madoff Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (“SIPA”) trustee against investment funds, their customers and individuals when the trustee failed “plausibly [to] allege that defendant[s] did not act in good faith.” SIPC v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 2014 WL 1651952, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. April 27, 2014).

Appellate courts continue to agree on the vitality and breadth of the safe harbor defense contained in Bankruptcy Code ("Code") § 546(e) (insulating from the trustee's fraudulent transfer or preference attack "settlement payment" or "margin payment" on a "securities contract," "commodity contract" or "forward contract" except when the debtor's payment is made with "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" creditors). In re Quebecor World (USA) Inc., 2013 WL2460726, *1 (2d Cir.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently dismissed a corporate debtor’s attempt to subordinate its former corporate parent’s contract damage claim on the ground that it was a securities fraud claim. CIT Group Inc. v. Tyco Int’l., Inc. (In re CIT Group Inc.), 2012 WL 3854887 (2d Cir. Sept. 6, 2012), affirming 460 B.R. 633 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on Aug. 16, 2011, affirmed the lower court’s decision authorizing reimbursement of expenses to qualified bidders for a reorganization debtor’s assets. In re Asarco, LLC, 2011 BL 213002 (5th Cir. Aug. 16, 2011). In the court’s view, the debtor provided “a compelling and sound business justification for the reimbursement authority.” Id. at *12.

Facts

The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently considered the enforceability of claims for "make-whole" amounts and damages for breach of a "no-call" provision. In re Chemtura Corp., No. 09-11233 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2010) ("Chemtura"). These provisions are generally enforceable outside of bankruptcy, but enforceability in the context of a bankruptcy case is still unclear. In Chemtura, the court did not actually rule on enforceability but approved a settlement that allocated value to creditors on account of a make-whole clause and a no-call provision.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held on Nov. 3, 2009, that a district court had improperly dismissed, on mootness grounds, an appeal from a bankruptcy court’s order confirming a reorganization plan. According to the Tenth Circuit, the appeal was reviewable because reversal of the plan confirmation order (1) would not unduly affect innocent third parties, and (2) would not undo any complex transactions.

In his Pre-Budget Report delivered on 24 November 2008, UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling announced the Government’s intention to introduce special insolvency procedures for investment firms holding client assets or client money.  

The procedures will be introduced by secondary legislation under the Banking Bill (which was introduced into Parliament in October 2008) following a government sponsored review by an expert liaison group.  

The review, to be concluded by summer 2009, will consider, inter alia: