In FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP,1 the Seventh Circuit recently held that transfers are not protected under the safe harbor of section 546(e) of the U.S.
(7th Cir. July 28, 2016)
The scope of the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor for certain financial contracts has been tested again, this time in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Louisiana. The question this time was whether an ipso facto provision continues to be safe harbored if enforcement of that provision is conditioned on other factors – in this case, the debtor’s failure to perform under the contract.
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently held that the Bankruptcy Code Section 546(e) safe harbors do not prevent a liquidation trust from pursuing some state law constructive fraudulent conveyance claims assigned to the trust by creditors.1 Notably, the Bankruptcy Court declined to follow the Second Circuit's recent Tribune decision, in which the Second Circuit concluded that the Section 546(e) safe harbors apply to state law constructive fraudulent conveyance claims on federal preemption grounds.2 Instead, the Bankruptcy Court decided that federal preemption did not appl
In a highly anticipated decision, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the "Court") on June 28, 2016, dismissed Counts I through XIX of Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.'s ("LBSF") fourth amended complaint (the "Complaint") in Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. Bank of America, N.A., et al.1 In doing so, the Court removed the majority of the approximately 250 noteholder, issuer and indenture trustee defendants from the LBSF lawsuit to recover over $1 billion distributed in connection with 44 swap transactions.
The bankruptcy court overseeing the Lehman Brothers chapter 11 cases rejected efforts by Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (LBSF) to recover roughly $1 billion in payments made to numerous noteholder defendants from the liquidation of collateral originally pledged to secure both obligations under notes issued by special purpose entities and credit default swap (CDS) obligations to LBSF, holding that the termination of the swap and liquidation and distribution of the collateral were protected by the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor.
Court holds that distributions made pursuant to priority payment provisions contained in CDO transactions are protected by Section 560 of the Bankruptcy Code
On May 5, 2010, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision declaring that a party’s right to setoff in an ISDA Master Agreement is unenforceable in bankruptcy unless strict mutuality exists. (Decision and Order).
On May 5, 2009, Judge James Peck, the Bankruptcy Judge in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy cases, held that the safe harbor provisions of the Bankruptcy Code do not override the mutuality requirements for setoff under section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. As a consequence, the Bankruptcy Court prohibited Swedbank, a non-debtor counter party to a swap agreement, from setting off pre-petition claims against Lehman against funds collected for Lehman’s account postpetition. See In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Bankr. Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently issued an opinion in the case of In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. that significantly restricts the scope of setoff rights for energy traders and other participants in derivatives and forward commodity markets. Traditionally, bankruptcy law has required mutuality between the debtor and a creditor as a prerequisite for the exercise of setoff rights by the creditor.