A recent opinion by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York affirms a 2010 ruling by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy court, which rendered certain netting and setoff provisions unenforceable in bankruptcy. The core holding – that a counterparty cannot offset pre-petition and post-petition amounts – should come as no surprise to market participants.

The trading rules and conventions of the loan market are well known to its participants. Similarly, the laws and practices governing equity securities trading in the U.S. are quite familiar to securities market professionals. The opportunity for confusion may arise, however, when these two markets quickly converge—for example, when the loans of a reorganized borrower are converted into or satisfied by the issuance of equity securities.

On February 28, Fitch addressed questions that have arisen related to the orderly liquidation authority under the Dodd-Frank Act and the securitization safe harbor. Fitch stated that clarifications from the FDIC provide comfort that the rights of investors can be determined at the outset of a securitization and that the ratings assigned to the transaction can be de-linked from those of the sponsoring entity.

In what appears to be a matter of first impression, Bankruptcy Judge Robert D. Drain, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, has held that a statutory safe harbor against constructive fraudulent conveyance actions under the Bankruptcy Code involving securities transfers does not apply to the private sale of securities, even when there are no allegations of illegal conduct or fraud involved in the underlying transaction.

In Geltzer v. Mooney (In re MacMenamin’s Grill, Ltd.), Adv. Pro. No. 09-8266 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. April 21, 2011), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that the safe harbor in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code does not apply to a small, private leveraged buyout (LBO) transaction that posed no systemic risk to the stability of the financial markets.

Prior to the 1984 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code1 (BAFJA), there was a split as to whether a transfer of title to real estate by virtue of a mortgage foreclosure constituted a transfer as defined in §101 of the Bankruptcy Code.2, 3 However, BAFJA made it clear that a “transfer” included “the foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of redemption.”4 This change in definition has a significant impact on the application of both §547 (preference) and §548 (fraudulent transfer).  

A recent New York bankruptcy case holds that the Bankruptcy Code's limitations on using avoidance actions to undo securities transactions did not apply where the underlying transactions did not implicate the public securities market. A debtor or bankruptcy trustee has the power and obligation to recover transfers made by the debtor, prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case, that were either actually or constructively fraudulent. There are, however, certain enumerated limitations to this power.

On January 25, 2010, United States Bankruptcy Court Judge James M. Peck issued a decision that limited the ability of parties to swap transactions to enforce certain of their contractual rights against a counterparty that has filed for bankruptcy. See Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. v. BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd.1 (the “BNY Decision”).

In Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc. v. Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1 Limited (In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.), Adv. P. No. 09-01032 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011) [hereinafter “Ballyrock”], the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a contractual provision that subordinates the priority of a termination payment owing under a credit default swap (CDS) to a debtor in bankruptcy, and which caps the amount of the termination payment, may be an unenforceable ipso facto clause under section 541(c)(1)(B).

Enron seems like ancient history but the Second Circuit has just issued an important decision in an Enron appeal confirming that the redemption of commercial paper made through DTC is entitled to the Bankruptcy Code § 546(e) exemption for “settlement payments” and, therefore, exempt from attack as preferential transfers. The Second Circuit held that this is so even though the Enron redemption payments were made prior to stated maturity, becoming the first Circuit Court of Appeal to address this issue. Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V.