How can creditors reduce the risk of a fixed charge being characterised as floating?

The determination as to whether a charge over a valuable asset is fixed or floating can be crucial to a creditor's recovery in an insolvency. To have two cases over the course of little more than a year providing detailed analysis of the nature of fixed and floating charges is indeed a treat. Are there any practical steps creditors can take to reduce the risk of a fixed charge being characterised as floating?

Fluctuating assets?

Early indications for the construction industry in the upcoming general election, JCT publishes the new Design and Build 2024 contracts, new second staircase requirement for qualifying residential buildings and a recent judgment requiring strict compliance with notice provisions in some building contracts

General election announced for 4 July 2024

The new law emphasises preventive restructuring, cross-border cooperation and equitable treatment of creditors

The European Union has recognised the need for harmonised insolvency laws across its member states and has taken a significant step forward with the introduction of the new EU Restructuring Directive ((EU) 2019/1023).

This directive aims to establish a common framework for insolvency proceedings, thereby enhancing cross-border cooperation and safeguarding the interests of all stakeholders involved.

HMRC has taken an increasingly active role in opposing restructuring plans with which it does not agree

Previously in this series, we explored whether restructuring plans present an alternative to formal insolvency, as well as the court's ability to exercise a cross-class cram down on opposing creditors.

Even if the statutory conditions for cramming down the votes of dissenting creditors has been met, the court retains a discretion to consider other factors

Certain statutory conditions need to be met in order for the court to sanction a plan at least one class of creditors or members has not voted in favour of the plan by the requisite majority (being 75% in value of those present and voting) – referred to as the "cross-class cram down".

Demonstrating that dissenting creditors are no worse off under a contested restructuring plan than in the relevant alternative is an essential requirement for the court to exercise its power to sanction the plan

The power of the court to sanction a restructuring plan where one or more classes of creditors or members has not voted in favour of the plan by the requisite majority (being 75% in value of those present and voting) is referred to as the "cross-class cram down".

Demonstrating what would most likely happen if a restructuring plan were not sanctioned is an essential element for the exercise of the court's discretion to cram down the votes of dissenting creditors

Restructuring plans under Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) may provide an alternative for companies in financial distress to formal insolvency (see our previous Insight).

Restructuring plans can provide companies in the early stages of financial difficulty with a flexible alternative to entering a formal insolvency procedure

Under Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006), companies or groups encountering financial difficulties affecting their ability to carry on business can propose a compromise or arrangement (a restructuring plan) which mitigates or eliminates the effects of those financial difficulties.

The preliminary draft of the law on structural changes of commercial companies approved by the Spanish Government on 14 February (the "Preliminary Draft") aims to transpose Directive (EU) 2019/2121 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132 regarding cross-border transformations, mergers and demergers of companies

There are many practical steps, pitfalls and strategies available for recovering commercial rent arrears, both before and after tenant insolvency