On November 27, 2012, Judge Shelley C. Chapman of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion in In re Patriot Coal Corporation1 transferring the chapter 11 proceedings pending before her to the Eastern District of Missouri.

To successfully reorganize in Chapter 11, a bankrupt company may need to retain key employees who understand the company’s business and who can design and implement the company’s reorganization plan. Retaining and properly incentivizing these employees during a Chapter 11 case can be challenging for a number of reasons.

On December 15, 2010, Judge James Peck of the US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the Bankruptcy Court) approved Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.’s (LBSF) motion (the Motion) for approval of a settlement among LBSF, BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited (BNY), Perpetual Trustee Company Limited (Perpetual) and others relating to certain note issuance and swap transactions with Saphir Finance Public Limited Company (Saphir) under a program known as the Dante Program.

Introduction

Sutton 58 Associates LLC v. Pilevsky et al., is a New York case which gets to the heart of the enforceability of classic single-purpose entity restrictions in commercial real estate lending. At issue is how far a third-party may go to cause a violation of a borrower’s SPE covenants, and whether those covenants are enforceable at all.

A Defaulted Construction Loan and Frustrated Attempts to Foreclose:

Equitable mootness is a judicially created doctrine often applied in appeals from orders of bankruptcy courts confirming chapter 11 plans of reorganization. In instances where granting relief on appeal would result in overturning the confirmation order and therefore unravelling a substantially consummated chapter 11 plan, appellate courts have, in certain circumstances, abstained from deciding appeals in reliance on equitable mootness.

In trotting a path out of Chapter 11, debtors in most cases will need to engage various key stakeholders, some of whom are not entitled to a distribution in the bankruptcy. As a form of remuneration, non-debtors may insist on receiving a release of liability - not only from claims belonging to the debtor, but also the claims of third-parties - in exchange for their support and contribution to the case.

When a portfolio company underperforms, a sponsor may consider various options to address the perceived performance issues, including changes to a portfolio company’s management team, cost structure, capital structure or other parameters, depending on the nature of the issue(s) at hand. When changes in capital structure may be desirable, often in the context of excessive debt and related liquidity issues, a sponsor’s choices may include a consensual workout outside of bankruptcy, or a court-supervised restructuring under Chapter 11 of the U.S.

Bankruptcy courts in the U.S. are widely viewed as favorable fora for debtors, trustees and creditors’ committees to pursue creative and difficult causes of actions against deep-pockets lenders and others in an attempt to augment the resources available for distributions to creditors. In yet another case, however, the District Court for the Southern District of New York (after withdrawing the litigation from the bankruptcy court), recently dismissed many of the claims asserted by the Lehman debtors against J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Several recent legal developments will likely impact acquisition finance.