On October 4, 2011, Judge James M. Peck of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in In re Lehman Bros. Inc., 2011 WL 4553015 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2011), that a “triangular setoff” does not satisfy the Bankruptcy Code’s mutuality requirement and that the Bankruptcy Code’s safe-harbor provisions do not eliminate that requirement in connection with setoffs under financial contracts.

Two recent decisions from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the "Bankruptcy Court") have further contributed to the rapidly expanding volume of chapter 15 jurisprudence. In In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 2011 WL 1998374 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2011), and In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 2011 WL 1998376 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2011), bankruptcy judge Burton R. Lifland rendered two decisions involving offshore "feeder funds" that invested in the massive Ponzi scheme associated with Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC ("BLMIS").

In a ruling that has been described as “very important” and the “first decision of its kind,” bankruptcy judge Shelley C. Chapman of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held on April 1, 2011, in In re Innkeepers USA Trust, 2011 WL 1206173 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

In the July/August 2010 edition of the Business Restructuring Review, we reported on an important ruling handed down by bankruptcy judge James M. Peck in the Lehman Brothers chapter 11 cases addressing the interaction between the Bankruptcy Code’s general setoff rules (set forth in section 553) and the Code’s safe harbors for financial contracts (found principally in sections 555, 556, and 559 through 562). In In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 433 B.R. 101 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

The early 2000s witnessed a wave of chapter 11 filings by entities with liability for asbestos personal-injury claims. The large number of filings was matched by the variety of legal strategies that companies pursued to address their asbestos liabilities in chapter 11. The chapter 11 case of Quigley Company, Inc. ("Quigley"), was one of the last large asbestos cases to file in the 2000s and represents one of the more interesting strategies for dealing with asbestos liabilities in chapter 11.

The failed bid of liquidators for two hedge funds affiliated with defunct investment firm Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., to obtain recognition of the funds’ Cayman Islands winding-up proceedings under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code was featured prominently in business headlines during the late summer and fall of 2007.

In the March/April 2014 issue of Business Restructuring Review, we discussed a recent trend among bankruptcy courts in the Southern District of New York confirming chapter 11 plans containing provisions that treat the fees and expenses of unofficial committees or individual official committee members as administrative expenses without the need to demonstrate that the applicants made a “substantial contribution” to the estate, as required by sections 503(b)(3)(D) and 503(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re AMR Corp., 497 B.R. 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

In Weisfelner v. Fund 1 (In re Lyondell Chem. Co.), 503 B.R. 348
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York held that the “safe harbor” under section
546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code for settlement payments made
in connection with securities contracts does not preclude
claims brought by a chapter 11 plan litigation trustee on behalf
of creditors under state law to avoid as fraudulent transfers
pre-bankruptcy payments to shareholders in a leveraged buyout

Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides a mechanism designed to preserve the creditor/shareholder risk allocation paradigm by categorically subordinating most types of claims asserted against a debtor by equity holders in respect of their equity holdings. However, courts do not always agree on the scope of this provision in undertaking to implement its underlying policy objectives. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this issue in In re Lehman Brothers Inc., 2014 BL 21201 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014).

Debt exchanges have long been utilized by distressed companies to address liquidity concerns and to take advantage of beneficial market conditions. A company saddled with burdensome debt obligations, for example, may seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with the same outstanding principal but with borrower-favorable terms, like delayed payment or extended maturation dates (a "Face Value Exchange"). Or the company might seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with a lower face amount, motivated by discounted trading values for the existing notes (a "Fair Value Exchange").