In a recent decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York distinguished excusable neglect in filing a claim before the expiration of a clear bar date. In a written opinion issued on May 20, 2010 in the case of In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., et. al, Case No. 08-13555 (JMP), Judge Peck denied seven motions for leave to file late claims finding none satisfied the Second Circuit’s strict standard to find excusable neglect.
A recent bankruptcy New York court decision1 highlights a less commonly used option for lenders to take control of troubled real estate projects. The lender obtained relief from the automatic stay to foreclose on membership interests pledged to secure its mezzanine loan instead of foreclosing on its mortgage against the underlying real property.
Here is the case, and what lenders can learn from it.
The Case
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, applying New York law, has held that an inadequate consideration exclusion unambiguously bars coverage for a lawsuit arising out of a debt restructuring transaction. Delta Financial Corp. v. Westchester Surplus Ins. Co. (In re Delta Financial Corp.), 2010 WL 1784054 (3d Cir. May 5, 2010).
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York recently addressed an objection to the debtor-in-possession financing approved by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in the bankruptcy of General Growth Properties.1 The District Court’s decision, which holds that reversal on appeal of an order approving DIP financing does not invalidate the financing or liens granted by the postpetition lenders, if provided in good faith also addresses both the timeliness of the appeal and the merits of the arguments raised therein, provides a detai
GFI Acquisition, LLC v. American Federated Title Corp., 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 1217
An action was brought by the plaintiff alleging that the defendants breached an agreement of purchase and sale by failing to disclose provisions in the agreement which would operate to lock the plaintiffs out of subsequent negotiations to refinance loans on the properties to be assumed on the date of closing.
In an interesting twist on a run-of-themill case regarding the personal liability of a corporate officer for unremitted sales taxes, the New York State Division of Tax Appeals held an owner (“Petitioner”) personally liable for sales tax even though the corporation was in Chapter 11 bankruptcy and was being run by a bankruptcy court-approved management company. In re Eugene Dinino, Docket Nos. 822605, 822606, 822607, 822608, 822609, 822610 (N.Y.S. Div. of Tax App. June 24, 2010).
A group of creditors learned the hard way that there may be no excuse for a late claim. U.S. Bankruptcy Judge James Peck of the Southern District of New York recently disallowed seven proofs of claim that had been filed late in the Lehman bankruptcies. Judge Peck held that the reasons cited by the parties for the late filing did not rise to the level of “excusable neglect” and he was thus disallowing their claims. This is of particular interest as it comes out of the Southern District of New York, which has one of the largest bankruptcy dockets in the country.
The automatic stay is one of the most fundamental bankruptcy protections. It enjoins the initiation or continuance of any action by any creditor against the debtor or the debtor’s property, including causes of action possessed by the debtor at time of the bankruptcy filing. The automatic stay offers this protection while bringing all of the debtor’s assets and creditors into the same forum, the bankruptcy court.
Given the overarching Madoff Ponzi scheme as well as other mini-Madoff schemes that surfaced in its wake, many have been following issues arising from the ability of a trustee to claw back transfers (either as preferential or as fraudulent transfers) from investors who redeemed their interests in a private investment fund or managed account that turned out to be a Ponzi scheme. The law generally provides that an investor’s principal investment is protected so long as it is received in good faith and for value.