A creditor’s ability to vote on a plan of reorganization is one of its most fundamental rights in a chapter 11 bankruptcy. For strategic investors in distressed debt, the power to vote—and potentially control a voting class (or obtain a blocking position in that class)— can be a critical tool in maximizing value and return on investment. Investors should be aware, however, that a recent decision by Judge Robert E.
Despite the prevalence of first-lien/secondlien structures in the loan market over the course of the recently-ended leveraged transaction cycle, fully-litigated cases interpreting the provisions of first-lien/second-lien intercreditor agreements remain something of a rarity. As a result, cases providing guidance on the extent to which customary waivers included in such intercreditor agreements would be enforced are always welcomed by finance practitioners. It comes as no surprise then, that the decision of Judge Peck of the U.S.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued an important ruling on March 1, 2010 in the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (Madoff Securities), adopting the trustee’s method of determining “net equity” for purposes of distributing “customer property” and Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) funds under SIPA.3
Securities Investor Protection Act
federal court in New York has dismissed as moot an appeal filed by plaintiffs with products liability claims pending against General Motors Corp. (GM) before it was sold in bankruptcy. In re: Motors Liquidation Co., No. 09 Civ. 6818 (U.S. Dist. Ct., S.D.N.Y., decided April 13, 2010). The plaintiffs sought to overturn a bankruptcy court’s approval of the automaker’s sale “free and clear” of their existing products liability claims as well as any successor liability claims they may have against the “new” GM.
On May 5, 2009, Judge James Peck, the Bankruptcy Judge in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy cases, held that the safe harbor provisions of the Bankruptcy Code do not override the mutuality requirements for setoff under section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. As a consequence, the Bankruptcy Court prohibited Swedbank, a non-debtor counter party to a swap agreement, from setting off pre-petition claims against Lehman against funds collected for Lehman’s account postpetition. See In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Bankr. Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
According to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, a lack of bad faith is no longer a defense to court sanctions for failure to produce documents in a timely manner. That court, in In re A&M Florida Properties II, recently awarded sanctions against both a party and its counsel for the counsel’s failure to become familiar with the client’s email and data-retention policies and systems— despite the absence of any bad faith or willful delay.1
On May 5, 2010, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision declaring that a party’s right to setoff in an ISDA Master Agreement is unenforceable in bankruptcy unless strict mutuality exists. (Decision and Order).
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently issued an opinion in the case of In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. that significantly restricts the scope of setoff rights for energy traders and other participants in derivatives and forward commodity markets. Traditionally, bankruptcy law has required mutuality between the debtor and a creditor as a prerequisite for the exercise of setoff rights by the creditor.
Following an initial FINRA arbitration award holding Steven Singer liable to Hartford Financial Holdings for compensatory damages, Mr. Singer filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy. After a complicated procedural history, the Bankruptcy Court granted relief from the automatic stay and allowed Hartford to proceed with this action in US District Court for the Southern District of New York.
Introduction