On November 25, LandAmerica Financial Group, Inc. (“LandAmerica”) filed a Chapter 11 petition in Virginia, seeking bankruptcy protection. By separate agreement (the “Stock Purchase Agreement”), LandAmerica agreed to sell Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company (“Commonwealth”) to Chicago Title Insurance Company (“Chicago Title”) and Lawyers Title Insurance Company (“Lawyers”) and United Capital Title Insurance Company (“United”) to Fidelity National Title Insurance Company (“Fidelity”).

Late the night of Nov. 25, LandAmerica Financial Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, LandAmerica 1031 Exchange Services, Inc., filed a Chapter 11 petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ("Bankruptcy Court"), seeking bankruptcy protection for both entities. The action does not cover Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company or Lawyers Title Insurance Company, two LandAmerica subsidiaries that are each domiciled in the State of Nebraska.

In Wagner v. United National Insurance Co. et al. (click here to read the decision), the Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed a district ruling that a regulatory exclusion in a D&O policy excluded coverage for the underlying action brought by the Director of Insurance of the State of Nebraska in his capacity as the bankruptcy liquidator of the insured, an insolvent insurance company.

In a recent action, Granite Re filed suit against Federal Crop Ins. Corp., Risk Management Agency and Ann Frohman, in her capacity as Liquidator for the insolvent insurer, American Growers Ins., alleging that Growers owes unpaid reinsurance premiums to Granite Re. Following removal to Federal Court, the Liquidator moved to dismiss, advising that she claims no interest in the outcome of Granite Re’s litigation against FCIC/RMA and she will therefore forego any right she may have had to remain in the litigation as an interested or intervening party.

Back in the mists of time, a seller that had a valid reclamation claim but was denied the return of its goods was entitled to an administrative expense claim (a claim with a higher priority than a general unsecured claim and thus a better chance of getting paid) or a lien on the debtor’s assets. The 2005 amendment to § 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code changed all that by stripping away those alternative remedies.

On April 23, 2024, the American Bankruptcy Institute’s Subchapter V Task Force issued its Final Report.

This article is the first in a series that summarizes and condenses the Task Force’s Final Report into “a nutshell.” This article:

• provides background information and data on Subchapter V.[Fn. 1]

Overall

Debtor’s Chapter 11 counsel cannot be compensated for services performed after a trustee is appointed and the debtor removed from possession.

• That’s the rule of law in the Fifth Circuit and in a not-for-publication decision of the Ninth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, based on a U.S. Supreme Court ruling.

So . . . the question is, what about Subchapter V? Does that same no-compensation rule apply in Subchapter V when the debtor is removed from possession?

Ninth Circuit BAP Opinion

Bankruptcies with large tort claims are common:

• some involve a limited number of claimants (e.g., a drunk driver hits a bus or a restaurant serves bad food one evening); and
• others have large numbers of claimants, some of whom won’t even be known for at least another decade (e.g., asbestos cases).

Often in tort bankruptcies, the total amount of claims overwhelms the debtor’s ability to pay: i.e., existing assets, insurance coverages and projected future income streams are, simply, insufficient.

The opinion is Bruce v. Citigroup Inc., Case No. 22-1000, decided August 2, 2023, by the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals.

The opinion addresses this question:

The existence of a bankruptcy option is a good thing for any debtor-creditor situation that is highly stressed—whether the bankruptcy option is used or not.

This is especially true in mass-tort cases where a potential exists for (i) hugely-disparate results for similarly situated plaintiffs, and (ii) debilitating delays in the progress of litigation.