This past May, in a highly-anticipated decision, the Supreme Court held in Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC that a debtor’s rejection of an executory contract under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code has the same effect as a breach of contract outside of bankruptcy.

Exculpation provisions in operating agreements must be carefully crafted in order to protect members, managers, directors and officers for breaches of fiduciary duties. In In re Simplexity, LLC, the Chapter 7 trustee sued the former officers and directors (who were also members and/or managers) for failing to act to preserve going concern value and exposing the debtors to WARN Act claims. The defendants argued the exculpation language in the operating agreements shielded against breach of fiduciary duty liability.

Shareholders who received nearly $8 billion from the Tribune Company leveraged buyout (LBO) do not have to give back that money as a constructive fraudulent transfer. Although the possibility remains that the creditors can recover this money through the pending intentional fraudulent transfer claims, which are much more difficult to prove, the Second Circuit recently held that the Bankruptcy Code preempts creditors from recovering under state constructive fraud theories when shareholders receive distributions under securities contracts effectuated through financial institutions.

In the aftermath of recent municipal bankruptcies in which issuers proposed and/or implemented bankruptcy plans involving partial discharges of the issuer’s payment obligation on insured bonds, there has been increased focus on whether municipal bond interest paid by a bond insurer after the bankruptcy plan’s effective date continues to be tax-exempt.

In a recent decision by the influential Third Circuit Court of Appeals, In re KB Toys Inc., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 23083 at *17 (3d Cir. Nov. 15, 2013), the Court decided that “the cloud on the claim” stemming from a preferential payment made to the original claimant continues with the claim, which then could be disallowed.

Electric vehicle battery manufacturer A123, which received a $249 million stimulus grant from the Department of Energy, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection October 15 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware to facilitate an agreement in which Johnson Controls will purchase its automotive business assets for $125 million. The company has drawn down roughly $131 million of its grant, and has faced problems with batteries supplied to Fisker as well as low demand for electric vehicles.

The bankruptcy court ruled today that the City of Harrisburg’s Chapter 9 petition filed by the Harrisburg City Council was not specifically authorized under Pennsylvania law.  After extensive briefing from the parties concerning, among other things, the constitutionality of Act 26 – the law passed in June 2011 to prohibit “third class” cities like Harrisburg from filing Chapter 9 -- the court ruled the law was constitutional and prohibited Harrisburg from becoming a Chapter 9 debtor.  The case has been dismissed.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently confirmed that bankruptcy plans need not always recognize subordination agreements among creditors.

Over the last two years, much of the healthcare world has been watching the government’s prosecution of Insys Therapeutics for its sales and marketing practices related to its Subsys spray. Subsys is powerful and highly addictive fentanyl spray (administered under the tongue) that was approved by the FDA in 2012 for the treatment of persistent breakthrough pain in adult cancer patients who were already receiving, and tolerant to, regular opioid therapy.

It is very common for bankruptcy court orders to provide that the court retains jurisdiction to enforce such orders. Similarly, chapter 11 confirmation orders routinely provide that the bankruptcy court retains jurisdiction over all orders previously entered in the case. The enforceability of these “retention of jurisdiction” provisions, however, will not rest on the plain language in the order but on the bankruptcy court’s statutory jurisdiction.