In this memorandum opinion, the Court of Chancery denied the plaintiffs’ (Roseton OL LLC and Danskammer OL, LLC) motion seeking to temporarily restrain the consummation of a transaction pursuant to which defendant Dynegy Holdings, Inc. (“DHI”) would transfer its most profitable power plants from existing subsidiaries to new bankruptcy remote subsidiaries.

Last week, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware (the “Court”) reversed a 2015 decision by the Delaware Bankruptcy Court (the “Bankruptcy Court”) disallowing the portion of an unsecured claim filed by appellant Wilmington Trust Company (“WTC”) for postpetition attorneys’ fees and costs incurred under an indenture in connection with the In re Tribune Media Co. chapter 11 cases.

On June 14, 2016, Judge Thuma of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico issued a memorandum opinion holding that a debtor could reject a prepetition settlement agreement that was determined to be executory in nature.

In this memorandum opinion, the Court of Chancery considered a motion to dismiss claims brought on behalf of Insilco Technologies, Inc. (“Insilco”) by the plaintiff, a bankruptcy court appointed Creditor Trustee. Among other claims, plaintiff brought claims for breach of fiduciary duty against Insilco’s controlling stockholder, a group of affiliated funds (the “DLJ Funds”) allegedly dominated and controlled by DLJ, Inc. and DLJ Merchant Banking, Inc. (“DLJMB”) (collectively, “DLJ”), and a group of DLJ-affiliated directors who comprised a majority of Insilco’s board.

In this memorandum opinion, the Court of Chancery granted plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint in part, and denied their motion to appoint a receiver for Advance Realty Group, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (“ARG”) conducting business as a real estate investment and development company. Plaintiffs, all of whom are members of ARG, initially brought claims for breach of fiduciary duty and contract against ARG and the other defendants, which include members of ARG’s managing board (the “Board”), its senior management, and its principal investors.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida has reversed a bankruptcy court order that had required a group of lenders (“Transeastern Lenders”) to disgorge, as a fraudulent transfer, approximately $421 million paid to them by a joint venture partner (“TOUSA”) in satisfaction of their legitimate, uncontested loans to the joint venture that TOUSA had guaranteed. Together with pre-judgment interest, the total amount to be paid by the Transeastern Lenders was in excess of $480 million.

In this memorandum opinion, the Court of Chancery declined to reopen the trial record and granted a plaintiffs’ motion to exclude post-trial evidence proffered by a defendant.In reaching its conclusion, the Court found that none of the factors for reopening a trial record articulated in Pope Invs. LLC v. Benda Pharm, Inc., 2010 WL 3075296, at *1 (Del. Ch.

On July 9, 2012, Judge Peter J. Walsh of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a memorandum opinion (the "Opinion"), in the Blitz U.S.A. bankruptcy proceeding addressing whether an employee bonus plan is a transaction made in the ordinary course of business under 11 U.S.C.

In our May 24 entry on this topic, the Northern Mariana Islands Retirement Fund (the “Fund”) was battling numerous challenges to its Chapter 11 eligibility. The dispute revolved around whether the Fund, which provides benefits to government workers and retirees, was a “governmental unit” as defined by the Bankruptcy Code. In a decision from the bench on June 1st, U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge Robert Faris affirmed his May 29th tentative ruling that the Fund is a “governmental unit” and, as such, is ineligible for Chapter 11.

In this memorandum opinion, the Court of Chancery denied a motion filed on behalf of a dissolved corporation to dismiss a petition for the appointment of a receiver under 8 Del. C. § 279, ruling that the petitioners might “conceivably” demonstrate entitlement to such appointment in light of their factual allegations concerning the dissolved corporation’s “plan of dissolution” under 8 Del. C. § 281(b). The Court also granted the petitioners’ motion to perfect service upon the dissolved corporation and denied the motion to dismiss for insufficiency of service of process.