In the bankruptcy proceedings in respect of Mr Gabriel Ricardo Dias-Azedo (the "Bankrupt"), the Court of First Instance recently exercised its discretion under sections 37(2) and 97 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap. 6) (BO) in favour of two creditors and granted them a priority claim against the Bankrupt's estate for their costs in preserving his assets incurred before receiving notice of the bankruptcy petition.

Background

A mandatory bid (or a mandatory general offer obligation) ("GO Obligation") will be triggered if a controlling block in a listed company ("Controlling Block") changes hands.

The chain principle summarised

On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (the “Circuit Court”) issued an opinion in In re TOUSA, Inc.,¹ in which it affirmed the original decision of the bankruptcy court and reversed the appellate decision of the district court. After a 13-day trial, the bankruptcy court had found that liens granted by certain TOUSA subsidiaries (the “Conveying Subsidiaries”) to secure new loans (the “New Term Loans”) incurred to pay off preexisting indebtedness to certain lenders (the “Transeastern Lenders”) were avoidable fraudulent transfers.

The Court of Appeal has confirmed that the costs of complying with Financial Support Directions (“FSDs”) proposed to be issued to certain Nortel and Lehman companies by the Pensions Regulator (“TPR”) qualify as “super priority” administration expenses, payable in priority to unsecured creditors, floating charge holders and the administrators’ own fees.

The question

On February 7, 2011, in a highly anticipated decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that in Chapter 11 reorganizations, senior creditors may not “gift” recoveries to junior creditors and/or equity interest holders over the objection of an intervening class. In In re DBSD N.A., Inc., __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 350480 (2d Cir. 2011), the majority ruled that such “gift plans” run afoul of the “absolute priority rule,” which is codified in Section 1129(b) of Bankruptcy Code. The decision has significant implications for future bankruptcy cases in New York.

Armed with an adjudicator’s decision and a TCC enforcement judgment, can a party issue a statutory demand for payment, even if the other party has a genuine and substantial cross claim against the sum awarded? No, said Judge Stephen Davies in Shaw v MFP. Neither the Construction Act nor the Scheme was intended to displace the position under the Insolvency Rules, which give the court discretion to set aside a statutory demand if the debtor appears to have a counterclaim, set-off or cross demand which equals or exceeds the debt in the statutory demand.

Following consultation last autumn, the Government is once again changing the Regulations under s75 Pensions Act 1995.

The changes1 take effect on 6 April 2010. They are intended to facilitate corporate restructurings. They also address some minor technical issues. The Government has postponed any more fundamental rewriting of the Regulations, saying that “this is a complex area that deserves closer consideration”.

Restructurings

German gaming group Löwen Play obtained sanction for a scheme of arrangement following a hearing in the High Court on 5 May 2022. Mr Justice Johnson granted an order sanctioning the scheme following its approval by a significant majority of creditors at the single scheme meeting. The group operates a gaming arcade business in Germany and the Netherlands, and the relevant scheme company was incorporated in Germany.

Whether—and in what circumstances—a debtor should pay creditors a make-whole premium continues to be litigated in bankruptcy courts. Last week, as reported by Bloomberg, Judge Dorsey (Delaware) ruled that the debtor – Mallinckrodt Plc – did not need to pay a make whole premium to first lien lenders in order to reinstate such obligations under the debtor’s chapter 11 plan.

With more than $1.7 trillion in student loan debt outstanding in the United States, student loan borrowers sometimes try to turn to the bankruptcy courts for relief, often without success due to the fact that most student loans are presumed to be nondischargeable.[1] In its July 15, 2021 decision in In re Homaidan,