Torchlight was a private equity fund investing in distressed assets. One of its investments was the purchase of a debt from Bank of Scotland International totalling $185m, of which Torchlight had repaid all but $37m. Being in a difficult liquidity position to pay off the debt, Torchlight sought bridging finance from a Mr Grill. Torchlight and Mr Grill entered into a 60-day contract in which Mr Grill would provide $37m to discharge the debt.
In Erwood v Official Assignee [2015] NZCA 478 an application was made to review a decision declining to dispense with security for costs. The applicant, Mr Erwood, argued that he had demonstrated impecuniosity, and that the Registrar had erred in finding to the contrary.
Mr Erwood held nearly $800,000 on deposit with a bank. His account had been frozen by the bank on the basis that Mr Erwood lacked the capacity to give the bank authority for the account. The bank had formed this view on information provided to them by Mr Erwood.
The majority expressly noted that, had they not felt bound by the Supreme Court’s interpretation, they would have agreed with the minority and required the investor to pay back not just the fictional profits, but also the profits of his capital investment.
We look at the reverberations last year from Fences & Kerbs and speculate on their continuing effect this year.
Case volume
In Cook v Mortgage Debenture, Mr Cook applied to be joined to a proceeding that was being continued by a claimant company after it had been placed into administration. The issue was whether the Court's consent was required on the basis that the application was against a company in administration (the English legislation being similar to section 248 of the Companies Act 1993). The Court concluded that, while the moratorium covered legal proceedings against a company in administration or liquidation, it does not cover defensive steps in proceedings brought (or contin
In Madsen-Ries and Vance v Petera the High Court found that the directors of Petranz Limited (in liquidation) had breached certain directors' duties under the Companies Act and, as a consequence, were liable to pay compensation to the Company. In particular, the directors failed to keep proper financial records and produce financial statements.
The decision of Graham & Jackson v Arena Capital Limited (In Liquidation) concerned an application under the Companies Act 1993 by liquidators seeking direction on the application of liquidation funds.
The Court of Appeal has found that receivers can be personally liable for body corporate levies accrued during a receivership.
The judgment is based on a broader interpretation of the relevant provisions in the Receiverships Act 1993 than applied by the High Court in Body Corporate 162791 v Gilbert, and reverses that decision.1
How does the objective of achieving payment for creditors in insolvency interact with the objectives of pension legislation, which seeks to ensure that individuals are adequately provided for in retirement? The courts in New Zealand and in the UK have each recently grappled with this issue. In both of the recent cases considered in this article the pensions objectives won out and the specific pension funds in question were not made available for the bankrupt individual's creditors.
If asked to provide information to a liquidator, the safest course may be to provide it under oath under section 261 of the Companies Act 1993 because the High Court has found that immunity will apply to such statements.
We look at the decision.
The case
In Body Corporate 162791 v Gilbert [2014] NZHC 567, the High Court found that receivers are not personally liable under s 32(5) of the Receiverships Act 1993 (the Act) for body corporate levies under the Unit Titles Act 2010.
The facts