The recent chapter 11 filings by PG&E Corp. and its Pacific Gas & Electric Co. utility subsidiary (collectively, "PG&E") and FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. have reignited the debate over the power of a U.S. bankruptcy court to authorize the rejection of contracts regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"). Only a handful of courts have addressed this thorny issue to date, and with conflicting results in a controversy that may ultimately need to be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court or legislative action.

In Kaye v. Blue Bell Creameries, Inc. (In re BFW Liquidation, LLC), 899 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2018), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit broadened the scope of section 547(c)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code’s "subsequent new value" defense against preference actions by holding that the provision applies to all new value supplied by the creditor during the preference period and not merely to new value that remains unpaid on the bankruptcy petition date.

The Bankruptcy Code contains an array of provisions designed to encourage lenders to provide debtor-in-possession ("DIP") financing in chapter 11 cases, including authorization of "superpriority" administrative expense claims and "priming" liens designed to ensure that DIP loans are repaid. However, as illustrated by a ruling recently handed down by the U.S.

In Varela v. AE Liquidation, Inc. (In re AE Liquidation, Inc.), 866 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit became the sixth circuit court of appeals to rule that a "probability standard" applies in determining whether an employer is relieved from giving 60 days’ advance notice to employees of a mass layoff under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988 (the "WARN Act").

On June 27, 2017, the Court granted certiorari n PEM Entities LLC v. Levin, No. 16-492 (U.S. June 27, 2017), in which it will have the opportunity to consider "[w]hether bankruptcy courts should apply a federal rule of decision (as five circuits have held) or a state law rule of decision (as two circuits have held, expressly acknowledging a split of authority) when deciding to recharacterize a debt claim in bankruptcy as a capital contribution." The Court agreed to review the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in PEM Entities, LLC v.

With its landmark ruling in Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Large Private Beneficial Owners (In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig.), 818 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2016) ("Tribune 1"), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that claims asserted by creditors of the Tribune Co. ("Tribune") seeking to avoid payments to shareholders during a 2007 leveraged buyout ("LBO") as constructive fraudulent transfers were preempted by the "safe harbor" under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code.

In 1994, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to add section 1123(d), which provides that, if a chapter 11 plan proposes to "cure" a default under a contract, the cure amount must be determined in accordance with the underlying agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy law. Since then, a substantial majority of courts, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, have held that such a cure amount must include any default-rate interest required under either the contract or applicable nonbankruptcy law. See, e.g., JPMCC 2006-LDP7 Miami Beach Lodging, LLC v.

Sabine Bankruptcy Judge Authorizes Rejection of Gas Gathering Agreements

In In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 2016 BL 70494 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2016), Judge Shelley C. Chapman of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York permitted Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation (“Sabine”) to reject three gas gathering and handling agreements with Nordheim Eagle Ford Gathering, LLC (“Nordheim”) and HPIP Gonzales Holdings, LLC (“HPIP”). All of the agreements are governed by Texas law.

Section 547(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code excepts from the trustee’s power to avoid preferential transfers any transaction in which the debtor transfers property to a creditor in the “ordinary course of business.” Exactly what constitutes “ordinary course of business,” however, is not a settled question of law. In Jubber v. SMC Electrical Products (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 798 F.3d 983 (10th Cir. 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether a first-time transaction between a debtor and a creditor can satisfy the ordinary course exception.

A “structured dismissal” of a chapter 11 case following a sale of substantially all of the debtor’s assets has become increasingly common as a way to minimize costs and maximize creditor recoveries. However, only a handful of rulings have been issued on the subject, perhaps because bankruptcy and appellate courts are unclear as to whether the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the remedy.