The Bankruptcy Code’s cramdown provisions are a powerful tool for debtors in the plan confirmation process. Pursuant to section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code, a plan may be confirmed if, among other things, “at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan.” Once there is an impaired accepting class, and assuming certain requirements are met, the plan may then be “crammed down” on all other classes of impaired creditors that reject the plan and those creditors will be bound by the terms of a plan they rejected.

LBOs can get messy. Such was the case for the Tribune Company, which, in conjunction with its private equity investor, borrowed approximately $10.7 billion in 2007 to finance its buyout. Soon after the LBO was completed, Tribune experienced financial difficulties that made it unable to service its new debt, and, in December 2008, the company filed for chapter 11 protection.

Section 1104(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee “if such appointment is in the interests of the creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of the estate . . . .” While it is not often that we see a court displace management pursuant to section 1104(a)(2), it does happen on occasion. One such recent case is In re China Fishery Group Limited. Case No. 16-11895 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28. 2016), where Judge James L. Garrity, Jr.

A decision from the United States Supreme Court penned by Justice Sonia Sotomayor adopted a broad reading of “actual fraud” in section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, which excepts from discharge debts “obtained by . . .

A recent decision from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas caught our eye because of the unconventional opening line:

“Summers are hot in Texas, so pools are a hot item. But not hot enough to help a pool installer [ . . . ] avoid bankruptcy” – Judge Tony M. Davis, United States Bankruptcy Judge.

Although our Blog focuses more on corporate restructuring issues than individual bankruptcies, the discharge of student loan debt is a topic that seems to be an exception to that rule (see The Eternal Pursuit to Collect: Due Process Rights and Actions to Collect on a Debtor’s Defaulted Student Loans,

We’ve previously written on various cases in which parties have sought to save or revive late filed pleadings by arguing those pleadings “relate back” to previously filed documents with varying degrees of success.

In Providence Hall Associates Limited Partnership v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the Fourth Circuit denied plaintiff’s attempt to receive a second bite at the apple, finding that plaintiff’s lawsuit was appropriately dismissed by the district court on res judicata grounds.

In this day and age, there’s not much appetite for the artificial (whether it be artificial sweetener or feigned affection).  We want our food, relationships, and clothing to be authentic and legitimate.  Unfortunately, as demonstrated by a recent decision from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, artificiality still manages to creep into certain chapter 11 plans and courtrooms in the form of “artificial impairment.”  Artificial impairment refers to a scenario whereby a debtor, which may otherwise be capable of satisfying a class of claims in full, proposes to impair the claim

“‘Two roads diverged in the woods and I took the road less traveled’ [sic] … and it hurt, man! Not cool, Robert Frost! … But what if there really were two paths?  I want to be on the one that leads to awesome.”
– Kid President (Robby Novak)