Overview

Executive Summary

On March 15, 2021, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals (the “Third Circuit”) held that a stalking horse bidder may assert an administrative expense claim pursuant to section 503(b)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code for costs incurred in attempting to close on an unsuccessful transaction, even when the stalking horse bidder is not entitled to a breakup or termination fee.

In an important decision issued at the end of August, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in In re Tribune Co., Case No. 18-2909 (3d Cir. Aug. 26, 2020), held that subordination agreements need not be strictly enforced when confirming a chapter 11 plan pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code’s cramdown provision in section 1129(b)(1). In its decision, the Third Circuit also encouraged bankruptcy courts to apply “a more flexible unfair-discrimination standard” and set forth eight guiding principles to aid in that effort.

The below is a quick snapshot of three recent tax-related developments in the insolvency and restructuring sphere.

Farnborough – appointment of a receiver and tax grouping

In the spirit of the season, we’re (re)visited by Doron Kenter, a member of the Weil Bankruptcy Blog’s O.G. Editorial Board (and, as far as we can tell, still holder of the dubious distinction of having published the most posts for us).

Yesterday, the United States Supreme Court, in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., Case No. 16-784, ruled that the “securities safe harbor” under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, does not shield transferees from liability simply because a particular transaction was routed through a financial intermediary—so-called “conduit transactions.”

In chapter 11 reorganizations, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3003(c)(3) provides that “[t]he court shall fix and for cause shown may extend the time within which proofs of claim or interest may be filed” (commonly known as the bar date). For a creditor or interest holder to be subject to this bar date, they must have received notice to satisfy due process. A known creditor, one that is reasonably ascertainable, must receive “actual notice.” Simply receiving a court-approved bar date notice from the debtor is enough to satisfy this requirement for due process.

We’ve previously commented on this blog on a number of decisions (see: (i) Too Little, Too Late: Ninth Circuit Holds Confirmation Objection Insufficient to Revive Untimely Complaint Objecting to Dischargeability of Debt, (ii)

Key Employee Retention Plans (KERPs) and Key Employee Incentive Plans (KEIPs) often are the subject of intense interest, either because a distressed company’s management is focused on developing such programs to retain valuable talent during a time of great uncertainty within its organization or because certain creditor constituencies or parties in interest take issue with the payments a debtor intends to make under the programs.

The power of a debtor or trustee to avoid preferential transfers that benefit certain creditors over others is critical to achieving one of the primary tenets of the Bankruptcy Code – the equality of treatment among all creditors. This ability to recover preferences prevents a debtor from favoring certain creditors over others by transferring property in the time leading up to a bankruptcy filing. Although these preference powers are broad, they are restrained by certain conditions, including a minimum threshold on amounts that can be avoided.