The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the Court), has held that section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits a swap counterparty from setting off amounts owed to the debtor against amounts owed by the debtor to affiliates of the counterparty, notwithstanding the safe harbor provision in section 561 of the Bankruptcy Code and language in the ISDA Master Agreement permitting the swap counterparty to effect “triangular” setoffs. In re Lehman Brothers Inc., Case No. 08-01420 (JMP)(SIPA) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. October 4, 2011).
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (LBHI) and its affiliated U.S. chapter 11 debtors (the “Debtors”) filed a joint plan with the Bankruptcy Court on March 15, the last day on which the Debtors who filed petitions on September 15, 2008, had the exclusive right to file a plan. As a result of the filing, the Debtors have an additional 60 days during which no other party may file a plan.
The District Court sustained claims of breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and deepening insolvency asserted by the successor-in-interest to the Committee of Unsecured Creditors of DVI, a defunct company, against DVI’s former officers and directors.
What Is the "Rule in Gibbs"?
The rule in Gibbs is a long-established common law principle in which the Court of Appeal determined that a debt governed by English law cannot be discharged or compromised by a foreign insolvency proceeding(Anthony Gibbs and Sons v La Société Industrielle et Commerciale des Métaux (1890) 25 QBD 399). The rule in Gibbs remains a fundamental tenet of English insolvency law.
Why Does the Rule in Gibbs Matter?
In a decision of significance to the distressed claims trading community, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in In re KB Toys Inc.[1] recently held that any risk or “cloud” of disallowance under the Bankruptcy Code resulting from a creditor’s receipt of an avoidable transfer cannot be separated from a claim, even when such claim is in the possession of a subsequent transferee.
In re Zais Investment Grade Ltd. VII1 is the latest in a recent line of bankruptcy cases challenging bedrock assumptions regarding securitization special purpose entities (SPEs) and bankruptcy considerations in securitization transactions.2 Zais establishes precedent allowing a senior noteholder of a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) to place the CDO issuer in an involuntary chapter 11 bankruptcy in order to advance an asset management plan that would otherwise require supermajority approval of all noteholders (including all junior classes) under the related indenture.
A recent court ruling by U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Burton Lifland clarifies the process for determining how much money investors may be entitled to receive in connection with the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) proceeding involving the Madoff Ponzi scheme. The new ruling specifically related to whether investors could receive amounts equaling the totals appearing on their last account statements. The judge sided with the SIPC-appointed trustee, Irving Picard, who argued that investors could claim only the amount they first invested with Madoff (minus any withdrawals).
In proceedings commenced by the Financial Services Authority (FSA), the UK High Court ruled in December 2004 that Adrian Sam & Co (ASC) and John Martin, one of ASC’s two partners, were knowingly involved in the UK activities of an illegal overseas investment firm (a boiler room) and they were ordered to pay £360,000 (approximately $700,000) to 63 investors involved in the boiler room scam. A bankruptcy order was granted against John Martin in August 2006.
In a brief but significant opinion, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware reversed a decision by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware and allowed more than $30 million in unsecured, post-petition fees incurred by an indenture trustee ("Indenture Trustee").1 In reversing, the District Court relied upon a uniform body of Court of Appeals opinions issued on the subject.
The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware recently reversed a Court of Chancery decision declining to appoint a receiver for a dissolved Delaware corporation, Krafft-Murphy Company, Inc. (Krafft). The Chancery Court determined that a receiver was inappropriate because Krafft had no property for the receiver to distribute to potential tort victims. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that an unexhausted insurance policy is property of the dissolved company even after its three-year wind-up period under Delaware law.