In Mission Product Holdings Inc. v. Tempnology LLC, No. 17-1657, the Supreme Court has held that a debtor’s rejection of an executory contract does not abrogate the rights others enjoy under that contract. Although the Court’s ruling specifically dealt with rights to a trademark license, the reasoning appears broader than that. The Supreme Court has in effect done away with a debtor’s right to reject any lease, concession, license, or agreement and then prevent a counterparty from enjoying the use of the rights previously granted.

• Approximately 5,000 Bakery Confectionery Tobacco and Grain Millers Union (BCTGM) members across the country struck Hostess Brands, Inc., to protest the company’s imposition of its last, best, and final contract. That contract, which provided for an 8% wage cut and a 17% reduction in health and welfare benefits, was rejected by BCTGM members in September, but ratified by some 7,500 Hostess employees represented by the Teamsters. In October, Hostess received federal bankruptcy court approval to impose the contract.

On June 23rd, the First Circuit addressed the priority of claims asserted by senior noteholders and junior noteholders of debt issued by an insolvent bank. It affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding that the parties did not intend for the senior noteholders to receive post-petition interest payments prior to the junior noteholders receiving a distribution. In re: Bank of New England Corporation, Debtor.  

Two recent rulings have provided significant guidance on the determination of whether an entity is eligible to be a debtor under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. On April 26, 2010, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada issued a decision denying a motion to dismiss the Chapter 11 case of Las Vegas Monorail Company (LVMC) filed by Ambac Assurance Corp. In re Las Vegas Monorail Company (Las Vegas Monorail).

The United States Supreme Court (the “Court”) recently issued a long-awaited decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (“Jevic”), which limits the use of “structured dismissals” in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, requiring structured dismissals pursuant to which final distributions are made to comply with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme, or the consent of all affected parties to be obtained.1

What is a Structured Dismissal?

A few weeks ago, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Western District Court of Michigan’s holding in U.S. v. Quality Stores Inc., 424 B.R. 237 (W.D. Mich. 2010), that severance payments made to employees pursuant to an involuntary reduction in force were not “wages” for Federal Insurance Contribution Act (“FICA”) tax purposes. U.S. v. Quality Stores Inc., No. 10-1563 (6th Cir. 2012). The Sixth Circuit’s decision creates a circuit court split with the Federal Circuit and its 2008 decision in CSX Corporation v. United States, 518 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

On June 7th, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the entry of summary judgment dismissing Chapter 13 debtors' claims against Wells Fargo, which holds debtors' mortgages. Debtors alleged that Wells Fargo violated the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provisions by recording in its internal records the fees it incurred to file its proof of claim. The Eleventh Circuit held that Wells Fargo did not violate the automatic stay because it had not collected or attempt to collect those fees. Similarly, a claim based on Wells Fargo's failure to disclose the fees was not yet ripe for action.

On May 18th, the Second Circuit, addressing the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, held that a lender with a purchase-money security interest in a car is entitled to an unsecured claim with regard to a deficiency it incurred upon the surrender and sale of the car. The deficiency claim derives from the contract between the parties and background state law. In the absence of a Bankruptcy Code provision expressly disallowing it, such an unsecured claim may be maintained.

Nearly four years after its decision in Stern v. Marshall raised new doubts about the place of bankruptcy courts in our legal system, the Supreme Court has finally put those doubts to rest. This week, in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, No. 13-935, the Court held that even for claims that must otherwise be resolved by an Article III court, a bankruptcy court may still adjudicate the matter based on consent.

On September 14, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court's finding that a failed bank's parent did not make a capital maintenance commitment to the bank. After the parent filed for bankruptcy, the FDIC was appointed receiver for the bank. The FDIC then sought payment from the parent under the statute requiring a party seeking reorganization to fulfill commitments to maintain the capital of an insured depository institution.