During this time of economic upheaval amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, many corporate borrowers are faced with the inability to service debt obligations, and creditors may seek to hold corporate officers and directors accountable as a result. In these uncertain times, it is wise to review the fiduciary duties of corporate directors and officers and the effects of financial distress on such duties.[1] The following Q&A provides guidance on this issue from a Delaware law perspective, as Delaware is the most commonly cited jurisdiction for corporate governance.

On February 4th, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims brought by plaintiffs, who controlled a mutual bank before it collapsed, against the FDIC as both regulator and as receiver. The Administrative Procedures Act (the "APA") claim against the FDIC as regulator, which seeks money damages and an order directing the FDIC to treat $23.6 million in subordinated debt as bank deposits, is a claim for substitute relief barred by the APA.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld a bankruptcy court’s ruling that, where subordination agreements lacked explicit provisions addressing the payment of post-petition interest on senior unsecured debt, the agreements were ambiguous, and an inquiry into the parties’ intent was required. After probing the facts and analyzing New York law, the bankruptcy court determined that the contracting parties did not intend to subordinate the junior unsecured debt to post-petition interest on the senior debt.

Background

On June 7th, the US Supreme Court addressed the calculation of a Chapter 13 debtor's projected "disposable income" under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. When a bankruptcy court calculates a debtor's projected disposable income, the court may account for changes in the debtor's income or expenses that are known or virtually certain at the time of confirmation. Hamilton v. Lanning.  

On November 12th, the Third Circuit affirmed both bankruptcy and district court findings that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a claim seeking rescission of a mortgage filed in an adversarial action in federal bankruptcy court after a state court entered a default foreclosure order on that mortgage. The Third Circuit held further that the entry of summary judgment against plaintiff on her Truth in Lending Act claim was proper.

In Mission Product Holdings Inc. v. Tempnology LLC, No. 17-1657, the Supreme Court has held that a debtor’s rejection of an executory contract does not abrogate the rights others enjoy under that contract. Although the Court’s ruling specifically dealt with rights to a trademark license, the reasoning appears broader than that. The Supreme Court has in effect done away with a debtor’s right to reject any lease, concession, license, or agreement and then prevent a counterparty from enjoying the use of the rights previously granted.

• Approximately 5,000 Bakery Confectionery Tobacco and Grain Millers Union (BCTGM) members across the country struck Hostess Brands, Inc., to protest the company’s imposition of its last, best, and final contract. That contract, which provided for an 8% wage cut and a 17% reduction in health and welfare benefits, was rejected by BCTGM members in September, but ratified by some 7,500 Hostess employees represented by the Teamsters. In October, Hostess received federal bankruptcy court approval to impose the contract.

On June 23rd, the First Circuit addressed the priority of claims asserted by senior noteholders and junior noteholders of debt issued by an insolvent bank. It affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding that the parties did not intend for the senior noteholders to receive post-petition interest payments prior to the junior noteholders receiving a distribution. In re: Bank of New England Corporation, Debtor.  

Two recent rulings have provided significant guidance on the determination of whether an entity is eligible to be a debtor under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. On April 26, 2010, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada issued a decision denying a motion to dismiss the Chapter 11 case of Las Vegas Monorail Company (LVMC) filed by Ambac Assurance Corp. In re Las Vegas Monorail Company (Las Vegas Monorail).

The United States Supreme Court (the “Court”) recently issued a long-awaited decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (“Jevic”), which limits the use of “structured dismissals” in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, requiring structured dismissals pursuant to which final distributions are made to comply with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme, or the consent of all affected parties to be obtained.1

What is a Structured Dismissal?