In the recent case of Lau Siu Hung v. Krzystof Marszalek (HCCW 484/2009, 17 June 2013) the Court of First Instance held that an annulment of bankruptcy does not debar a creditor, who has not proved his provable debt, from asserting his claim after the annulment.
Procedural Background
On May 4, 2012, the Delaware bankruptcy court inIn re KB Toys, Inc., et al. (KB Toys), handed down a thoughtful decision addressing the issue of whether impairments attach to a claim or remain with its seller. The KB Toys court held that “a claim in the hands of a transferee has the same rights and disabilities as the claim had in the hands of the original claimant. Disabilities attach to and travel with the claim.”
In BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail UK 2007 - 3BL PLC & Ors, the English Court of Appeal has decided that the mere fact that a company’s aggregate liabilities exceed its assets may not render the company to be deemed unable to pay its debts under section 123(2) of the UK Insolvency Act 1986 (commonly referred to as the “balance sheet test”). The test is whether a company has reached a point of no return such that its state of affairs is not or is unlikely to continue having regard to its contingent and future liabilities.
In a decision that reaffirms its previous rulings on the jurisdictional limits of bankruptcy courts, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Chakarian (In re W.R. Grace & Co.)1 that bankruptcy courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over third-party actions against non-debtors if such actions could affect a debtor’s bankruptcy estate only following the filing of another lawsuit.
Summary
Almost a year to the day since the High Court rejected the Amigo loans group's previous proposal for a scheme of arrangement, on 23 May 2022, Mr Justice Trower sanctioned the group's latest scheme proposal which would create the conditions for the group to resume lending and resolve the claims of thousands of the group's customers arising from its lending practices.
On October 10, 2021, Judge Colleen McMahon of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York entered a temporary restraining order, delaying implementation of Purdue Pharma’s plan of reorganization, which was confirmed by Bankruptcy Judge Robert Drain on September 17th, pending argument on the U.S.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the National Rifle Association’s (“NRA”) bankruptcy case on May 11, finding that the case was not filed in good faith. In his opinion, Judge Harlin Hale found that there was cause for dismissal because the case was filed “to gain unfair litigation advantage and … to avoid a state regulatory scheme,” neither of which he considered to be a purpose intended or sanctioned by the Bankruptcy Code.
Section 546(e) of the US Bankruptcy Code, which Congress enacted to promote stability and finality in financial markets, provides a safe harbor against the avoidance of certain securities transactions. Since the safe harbor’s inclusion in the original Bankruptcy Code, Congress repeatedly has expanded its protections to a growing assortment of financial transactions involving an increasing array of parties, whose involvement in the transaction may give rise to a defense to certain avoidance actions, including constructive fraudulent transfer claims.
So you have a freezing order against a start-up company, now what? Can that start-up use the assets which are the subject of your order, or any of its other assets, to continue to pursue its risky business, or must it stay idle and wait for the inevitable?
In the current period of flux, lenders should review their finance documents regarding protections and/or vulnerabilities; and where exposed to industries particularly affected by the COVID-19 outbreak may consider (i) invoking provisions to demand early repayment and/or to preclude further lending; and (ii) whether there is material benefit in doing so. They should also consider pre-emptive steps with a view to staving off critical defaults.