“[A] party moving for substantive consolidation must provide notice of the motion to the creditors of a putative consolidated non-debtor,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Sept. 9, 2019. In re Mihranian, 2019 WL 4252115 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 2019) (emphasis added).

“The right of setoff … allows entities to apply their mutual debts against each other to avoid the pointless exercise of ‘making A pay B when B owes A.’” held the Seventh Circuit on Aug. 17, 2018. Berg v. Social Security Administration, 900 F.3d 864, 868 (7th Cir. 2018). But the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) limits “a creditor’s right of setoff during the ninety-day period prior to the” date of bankruptcy, said the court. Id.

“[T]he Bankruptcy Code does not permit [an undersecured] creditor . . . to advance an unsecured claim for post-[bankruptcy] attorneys’ fees,” held the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina on Nov. 27, 2017. Summitbridge Nat’l Invs. Iii v. Faison, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195267, *8 (E.D. N. C. Nov. 27, 2017). Affirming the bankruptcy court, the district court agreed that “the Code is most properly interpreted to allow only oversecured creditors to add post-[bankruptcy] attorneys’ fees.” Id., at *10.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

A Chapter 11 debtor’s pre-bankruptcy “surrender of [two] … leases to [its landlord] could be regarded as a preferential transfer,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on March 11, 2016. In re Great Lakes Quick Lube LP, 2016 WL 930298, at *2 (7th Cir. March 11, 2016).

So-called “red flags” were not “sufficient to impose a duty on [a gambling casino (‘Casino’)] to investigate” a Chapter 11 debtor’s pre-bankruptcy fraudulent transfers to its insiders who gambled at the Casino, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on Oct. 13, 2015. In re Equipment Acquisition Resources, Inc., 2015 WL 5936354, at *6 (7th Cir. Oct. 13, 2015).

A bank did not engage in “egregious conduct” sufficient to subordinate its lien on equitable grounds, held the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on Dec. 10, 2014. In re Sentinel Management Group, Inc., 2014 WL 6990322 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2014) (“Sentinel IV”). Moreover, because of the bank’s “good faith,” the corrupt borrower’s fraudulent pledging of customer funds to the bank to secure a so-called $312-million rescue loan “cannot be avoided.” Id. at *10.

The New York Court of Appeals, on July 1, 2014, in response to questions certified by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held that “pending hourly fee matters are not [a dissolved law firm’s] ‘property’ or ‘unfinished business’” under New York’s Partnership Law. In re Thelen LLP, __ N.Y.3d __, slip op. at 2 (July 1, 2014); see In re Thelen LLP, 213 F.3d 213, 216 (2d Cir. 2013).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on August 5 that a secured lender’s disputed “lien on [the debtor’s] principal asset survived . . . confirmation of [the debtor’s] Chapter 11 . . . reorganization plan” because the lender had not participated in the bankruptcy case.S. White Transportation, Inc. v. Acceptance Loan Co., 2013 WL 3983343, *1,*3 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 2013). Had the lender participated in the case, the court reasoned, its lien might have been avoided.Id., at *1, citingIn re Ahern Enterprises, Inc., 507 F.3d 817, 822 (5th Cir.

A New York bankruptcy court recently held that a losing acquiror in a competing Chapter 11 plan fight had “standing” to seek reimbursement of its legal fees and expenses as a “substantial contribution” to the reorganization case. In re S & Y Enterprises, LLC, et al., 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 4622, at *4-*5 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y., September 28, 2012). Nevertheless, the losing acquiror failed to recover because, in the court’s view, it did not satisfy the statutory requirements for reimbursement with the requisite “preponderance of the evidence.” Id.