In a recent opinion, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland dealt with a conflict between the strong presumption in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements and the Bankruptcy Code’s emphasis on centralization of claims. Based on an analysis of the two statutory schemes and their underlying policies and concerns, the Court decided to lift the automatic stay to allow the prepetition arbitration proceeding to go forward with respect to non-core claims.
Background
No, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in In re Maxus Energy Corp. In Maxus, the defendant, Vista Analytical Laboratory, Inc. (“Vista” or the “Defendant”), a designated critical vendor, sought summary judgement dismissing the preference complaint. The Court denied summary judgement finding that the critical vendor status did not per se insulate Vista from preference actions.
Background
Merit Management
UK High Court Confirms Broad Definition of a “Financial Institution” – (Re Olympia Securities Commercial Plc (in administration) [2017] EWHC 2807 (Ch))
The High Court has confirmed it will adopt a broad definition of a “financial institution” for the purposes of the transferability provisions in a loan agreement including: (i) a newly incorporated company with a share capital of £1, (ii) an entity that has not traded and (iii) a special purpose vehicle established for the purpose of acquiring debt.
Facts
A debtor ordinarily may discharge debts in bankruptcy, unless one of several exceptions apply. One of the preclusions to dischargeability of certain debts, found in Section 523(a)(19) of the U.S.
Essentially all securitization structures utilize a bankruptcy remote entity, a/k/a special purpose entity (“SPE”), to reduce the lenders’ or investors’ exposure to a bankruptcy of the sponsor. A standard feature of SPEs is the appointment of an independent person (director, member, manager) to the body managing the SPEs. That independent person’s consent is required for “major decisions,” one of which is the filing of, or consenting to a bankruptcy of the SPE (hence the court’s reference to them as “blocking directors”).
As is well known, the right to credit bid is the entitlement of a secured lender to bid the amount of its outstanding claims at the sale of its collateral. If the secured lender places the winning bid, no money is exchanged and the purchase price is offset against the existing claims. Credit bidding provides an important right to secured lenders in ensuring that their collateral is not sold for a depressed value. If a secured lender thinks its collateral is being sold too cheaply, it has the option of taking the collateral in exchange for some or all its claims.
Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bank-ruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York on December 8, 2011 issued an opinion on a motion of the Lehman Brothers Inc. (“LBI”) trustee (“Trustee”) to confirm his determination that certain claims relating to settled on delivery-versus-payment “to be announced” (“TBA”) contracts do not qualify as customer claims against the LBI estate and therefore are not entitled to Securities Investor Protection Act (“SIPA”) coverage.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently affirmed lower court rulings that a bankrupt debtor was entitled to receive damages and attorneys’ fees for a creditor’s violation of the automatic stay in bankruptcy.
In so ruling, the Court held that:
The U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit recently reversed a bankruptcy court’s disallowance of postpetition interest at the default contract rate, holding that “the bankruptcy court erred in applying a liquidated damages analysis and ruling the default interest rate was an unenforceable penalty,” and also erred in weighing “equitable considerations” to avoid enforcing the contractual default interest rate.