Although it has been described as an “extraordinary remedy,” the ability of a bankruptcy court to order the substantive consolidation of related debtor-entities in bankruptcy (if circumstances so dictate) is relatively uncontroversial, as an appropriate exercise of a bankruptcy court’s broad (albeit nonstatutory) equitable powers. By contrast, considerable controversy surrounds the far less common practice of ordering consolidation of a debtor in bankruptcy with a nondebtor.

The Bankruptcy Code treats insiders with increased scrutiny, from longer preference periods to rigorous equitable subordination principles, denial of chapter 7 trustee voting rights, disqualification in some cases of votes on a cram-down chapter 11 plan, and restrictions on postpetition key-employee compensation packages. The treatment of claims by insiders for prebankruptcy services is no exception to this general policy: section 502(b)(4) disallows insider claims for services to the extent the claim exceeds the "reasonable value" of such services.

The solicitation of creditor votes on a plan is a crucial part of the chapter 11 process. At a minimum, a chapter 11 plan can be confirmed only if at least one class of impaired creditors (or interest holders) votes to accept the plan. A plan proponent’s efforts to solicit an adequate number of plan acceptances, however, may be complicated if creditors or other enfranchised stakeholders neglect (or choose not) to vote.

Recently, in Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., the U.S. Supreme Court resolved a conflict among the circuit courts of appeal by overruling the Ninth Circuit’s Fobian rule, which dictated that attorneys’ fees are not recoverable in bankruptcy for litigating issues “peculiar to federal bankruptcy law.” In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court reasoned that the Fobian rule’s limitations on attorneys’ fees find no support in either section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code or elsewhere.

Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides a mechanism designed to preserve the creditor/shareholder risk allocation paradigm by categorically subordinating most types of claims asserted against a debtor by equity holders in respect of their equity holdings. However, courts do not always agree on the scope of this provision in undertaking to implement its underlying policy objectives. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this issue in In re Lehman Brothers Inc., 2014 BL 21201 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014).

Few areas of law are as confusing—or as important to understand—as the growing
intersection of employment and bankruptcy law. In recent years, funding shortfalls
in multi-employer pension plans, which cover roughly 20 percent of U.S. workers
with defined-benefit plans, have increased pressure on participating employers
to reduce their contributions or even withdraw entirely. Although employers taking
these actions would incur withdrawal liability as a consequence, that liability can

Under the Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”) is required to satisfy postpetition obligations under any unexpired lease of commercial property pending a decision to assume or reject the lease. Specifically, section 365(d)(3) requires the trustee, with limited exceptions, to “timely perform all the obligations of the debtor . . . arising from and after the order for relief” under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property with respect to which the debtor is the lessee.

Until 2013, no circuit court of appeals had weighed in on the implications of the U.S. Supreme Court’s pronouncement in the 203 North LaSalle case that property retained by a junior stakeholder under a cram-down chapter 11 plan in exchange for new value “without benefit of market valuation” violates the “absolute priority rule.” See Bank of Amer. Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle Street P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999), reversing Matter of 203 North LaSalle Street P’ship, 126 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1997).

Recent Developments

Indentures often contain make-whole premiums payable upon early redemption of the debt, and term B loan agreements often include "soft call" protection in the form of prepayment premiums during the early life of the loan. If the debt issuer becomes subject to a chapter 11 proceeding after the debt issuance, the question then arises as to how this payment obligation is to be treated: Does the make-whole or prepayment premium constitute unmatured interest due as a result of the debt acceleration, which would be disallowed, or is it liquidated damages?