In September 2011, in In re Longview Aluminum, LLC, 10-2780 (7th Cir. 2011), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that members of an LLC are insiders for preferential transfer purposes under the Bankruptcy Code. This is the case even if the member holds only a minority membership interest and is not actually in control of the enterprise.
On April 26, 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted amendments to Rule 2019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (Amended Rule 2019) and submitted the proposed amendment to Congress for approval. Amended Rule 2019 was approved by Congress and became effective on December 1, 2011. The rule governs certain disclosure requirements for groups consisting of multiple creditors or equity security holders acting in concert in Chapter 9 or Chapter 11 cases.
In the first circuit-level opinion on the issue, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Matson v. Alarcon, 651 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 2011), held that, for purposes of establishing priority under section 507(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, an employee's severance pay was "earned" entirely upon termination of employment, even though the severance amount was determined by the employee's length of service with the employer.
Section 507(a)(4)
The case of In re Dickson, 655 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2011) centered on the status of the debtor’s manufactured home under Kentucky law. In Kentucky, a manufactured home is considered personal property. As such, in order for a lien to be effective, it must be noted on the certificate of title. A manufactured home may be converted to real property, however, if the owner files an affidavit that states it is permanently affixed to real estate and then surrenders title.
The bankruptcy court ruled today that the City of Harrisburg’s Chapter 9 petition filed by the Harrisburg City Council was not specifically authorized under Pennsylvania law. After extensive briefing from the parties concerning, among other things, the constitutionality of Act 26 – the law passed in June 2011 to prohibit “third class” cities like Harrisburg from filing Chapter 9 -- the court ruled the law was constitutional and prohibited Harrisburg from becoming a Chapter 9 debtor. The case has been dismissed.
A promissory note is a one-way undertaking. The maker promises to pay to the payee. There is nothing promised by the payee. The whole point of having a promissory note is to have a document that clearly states an obligation to pay. By contrast, most contracts are bilateral, meaning that each party promises to do something. And those promises are usually mutually dependent: if one party breaches, then the other may be excused from further performance. But that is not the case with a promissory note.
The fundamentals of corporate action can seem about as interesting as flossing. Yet, the failure to attend to either is likely to result in unpleasant consequences as one lawyer recently discovered in Winterton v. Humitech of No. Cal., LLC, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 4164 (9th Cir. BAP 2011).
The Sixth Circuit is one of only five federal appellate courts to institute a bankruptcy appellate panel under 28 U.S.C. § 158(b). (The others are the First, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth circuits.) As the bankruptcy appellate panel is unfamiliar to many non-bankruptcy attorneys, this post will review the Sixth Circuit’s bankruptcy appellate panel.
On November 22, 2011, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued a per curiam opinion that piqued the interest of bankruptcy practitioners nationwide and sent secured creditors scrambling to ensure that their rights to a deficiency claim had been properly preserved in pending bankruptcy cases. The Eleventh Circuit held that the IRS had waived its right to an unsecured deficiency by filing a proof of claim that evidenced a secured claim but failed to note that a portion of the claim may be unsecured.
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts recently issued an opinion in In re SW Boston Hotel Venture, LLC1 in which it found, among other things, that the assignment of voting rights from a junior creditor to a senior creditor pursuant to an intercreditor agreement was unenforceable. The opinion was rendered in connection with the court’s decision to confirm the plan proposed by the debtor, the owner of the W Hotel in Boston.
Background