As revealed in a recent bankruptcy case, purchasers of contaminated property need to have a very clear understanding of their contractual remedies before proceeding with self-help. The case (In re Evans Industries, Inc., No.

The Supreme Court recently issued its opinion in Stern v. Marshall (Stern), Case No. 10-179, 2011 WL 2472792 (U.S. June 23, 2011), invalidating the relatively common assumption that so called “core” bankruptcy proceedings are all matters in which the bankruptcy courts are permitted to enter final judgment, and undoubtedly fostering heightened jurisdictional scrutiny in the future.

The US Supreme Court has ruled in Stern v. Marshall (June 23, 2011) that a bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction to render final judgment on a bankruptcy estate’s compulsory counterclaim against a creditor arising under common law, despite a statutory grant of jurisdiction.

Earlier this year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a proposed “gifting” plan distributing value from the second lien lenders to the prepetition equity holder violated the absolute priority rule and was confirmed in error.2 This decision, by a 2-1 panel vote,3 reversed the decisions of the Bankruptcy and District Courts for the Southern District of New York. The Second Circuit also affirmed unanimously the designation of the vote of an indirect competitor of the debtor that held no claims prior to the petition date.

On January 25, 2010, United States Bankruptcy Court Judge James M. Peck issued a decision that limited the ability of parties to swap transactions to enforce certain of their contractual rights against a counterparty that has filed for bankruptcy. See Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. v. BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd.1 (the “BNY Decision”).

A theme running through many apparent-authority cases is the question of who loses: for example, the LLC whose property was used to secure unauthorized, personal borrowings by a member or manager, or the bank that in good faith made the loan to the malefactor? Often the recipient of the funds has used the money for personal matters and is essentially judgment proof.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada has held that proceeds from a professional liability policy were not property of the insured-debtors' bankruptcy estate because the proceeds were payable only for the benefit of third party claimants and could not be accessed by the debtors directly.  In re Endoscopy Center of Southern Nevada, Nos. BK-S-09-22780-MKN, S-09-22776-MKN, S-09-22784-MKN, 2011 WL 2184387 (Bankr. D. Nev. May 23, 2011).

Summary

In a 56 page opinion published June 9, 2011, Judge Walsh ruled that a method of operating in which all of the credits and debits between two companies were netted out allows this same method to be used in calculating a set-off defense in preference litigation. Judge Walsh’s opinion is available here (the “Opinion”).

Background

Enron seems like ancient history but the Second Circuit has just issued an important decision in an Enron appeal confirming that the redemption of commercial paper made through DTC is entitled to the Bankruptcy Code § 546(e) exemption for “settlement payments” and, therefore, exempt from attack as preferential transfers. The Second Circuit held that this is so even though the Enron redemption payments were made prior to stated maturity, becoming the first Circuit Court of Appeal to address this issue. Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V.

The U.S. Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision on June 28, 2011, held that Bankruptcy Code § 546(e), which exempts a “Settlement Payment” from a bankruptcy trustee’s avoiding powers, insulated two sellers of Enron Corporation’s commercial paper from suit despite Enron’s early pre- bankruptcy redemption. Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., ___F.3d ___, 2011 WL 2536101 (2d Cir. June 28, 2011) (2-1).