Last Thursday, a Delaware Bankruptcy Court disqualified two law firms from representing an Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors based on their conduct in soliciting proxies from creditors who were not existing firm clients. In re Universal Building Products, No. 10-12453 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 4, 2010), involved an extreme fact pattern but it may nonetheless have a substantial effect not only on the selection of professionals for future Committees but also on the appointment of creditors to Committees, at least in Delaware.

In October 2010, several important Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Court decisions were issued. This article summarizes those decisions.

The National Benevolent Association of the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), et. al v. Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, No. 09-6084, 09-6085 (8th Cir. BAP 10/8/10)

There have been a number of stories about how Ambac filed for Chapter 11 on November 8. However, there’s Ambac and then there’s Ambac and then there’s Ambac. If that all sounds the same to you, we are actually referring to three different Ambacs and the purpose of this blog is to help clear up the market confusion. First there is the Ambac that filed for Chapter 11 on November 8, which is Ambac Financial Group Inc. (AFG). This must mean that the bankruptcy trigger events in the contracts of all of Ambac’s insured counterparties were triggered by the bankruptcy filing, right?

Late this summer, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, took on an issue of first impression – whether the fraud of one partner can be imputed to an “innocent” partner in order to render a judgment non-dischargeable.

Introduction: Earlier this year, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC[1] sent shockwaves through the secured lending community. In a 2-1 decision, the court held that a debtor can confirm a plan of reorganization while denying the secured creditor the opportunity to credit bid for its collateral if the plan provides the lender with the "indubitable equivalent" of its claim.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on Oct. 19, 2010, corrected a bankruptcy court’s calculation of a secured lender group’s superpriority administrative claim more than two years after consummation of the debtor’s Chapter 11 reorganization plan. In re SCOPAC et al., F.3d__, 2010 WL 4069525, at *2-3, *5-6 (5th Cir. Oct. 19, 2010) (Jones, Ch.J.) [“Pacific Lumber II”]; see alsoIn re Pacific Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 242 (5th Cir. 2009) [“Pacific Lumber I”] (plan “substantially consummated within weeks of confirmation”).

Kitchin Associates LLC is a Pennsylvania limited liability company that is no longer in business. Richard Kitchin and his son were the members of Kitchin LLC and each held a 50% ownership interest in the entity. In a bankruptcy court proceeding, the Joan I. Glisson Trust asserted a claim against Mr. Kitchin in the amount of $257,047.63, arising from an unsatisfied mortgage loan to Kitchin LLC, the proceeds of which were used to purchase a property in Pennsylvania. Mr.

Section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code provides a statutory framework for compensation of professionals who are paid from the bankruptcy estate. Compensation awarded under section 330 is afforded administrative expense status under section 503(b)(2) and given second priority in the distribution of an estate pursuant to section 507(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Creditors of insolvent Delaware corporations have recourse against corporate directors and officers whose disloyal or self-dealing conduct reduces the corporation’s assets available for distribution. Delaware courts have held that directors and officers of insolvent corporations owe fiduciary duties to creditors as the principal stakeholders in the remaining corporate assets. Where those duties are breached, creditors have standing to bring actions derivatively on behalf of the corporation for damages to the corporation. However, in a recent decision by Vice Chancellor J.

Some legal commentators have lamented the extent to which lenders have been able to use debtor in possession (“DIP”) financing arrangements to gain control over an entire Chapter 11 case.