You might wonder whether lenders can enforce a guaranty of a loan from an individual or entity that has no formal connection with the borrower, i.e. someone who is not an owner or affiliated company. Generally, the answer is yes with some qualifications for potentially insolvent guarantors discussed below. However, lenders are well-advised to take the steps outlined at the end of this post to minimize the risk of a subsequent challenge by the guarantor.

Pursuant to a provision of the Bankruptcy Code familiar to readers of Weil’s Bankruptcy Blog (see our prior post, To Assume or Not to Assume, that Is the Question: What Act Constitutes “Assumption” Under Section 365(d)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code?), the United States District Court for the District of Delaware recently affirmed a bankruptcy c

In 2009, General Motors (“Old GM”) commenced a chapter 11 case and sold the bulk of its business and assets to a new entity (“New GM”) “free and clear” of liabilities against New GM. Notwithstanding the “free and clear” language of the 2009 sale order (the “Sale Order”), a Second Circuit panel recently held that plaintiffs could assert claims against New GM over faulty ignition switches in cars manufactured by Old GM and recalled in early 2014.

In re Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, Case No. 16-11247 (D. Del. June 3, 2016), the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware dealt with the issue of whether a Delaware LLC lacked authority to file a Chapter 11 petition under the Bankruptcy Code because the limited liability company agreement of the LLC in question required the consent of all members and one member did not consent to the filing.

The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently held that the Bankruptcy Code Section 546(e) safe harbors do not prevent a liquidation trust from pursuing some state law constructive fraudulent conveyance claims assigned to the trust by creditors.1 Notably, the Bankruptcy Court declined to follow the Second Circuit's recent Tribune decision, in which the Second Circuit concluded that the Section 546(e) safe harbors apply to state law constructive fraudulent conveyance claims on federal preemption grounds.2 Instead, the Bankruptcy Court decided that federal preemption did not appl

This is the first of three follow-up blogs to our earlier publication Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors: General Overview. This blog explores ABC’s lack of statutory automatic stay and whether there is a functional and practical equivalent. The next blog will discuss whether a creditor may file a claim after the statutory 120-day deadline.

We have written on other occasions on Civic Partners Sioux City, LLC.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Unsecured Creditors Committee of Sparrer Sausage Co., Inc. v. Jason’s Foods, Inc., 2016 WL 3213090 (7th Cir. June 10, 2016) expanded the scope of the ordinary course defense in a bankruptcy preference action.  This case provides an excellent road map for a creditors’ rights attorney defending a preference suit and suggests arguments for increasing the payments a creditor can retain even if those payments were made during the 90-day preference period.

Estate professionals are under continued scrutiny. Unlike other professionals, getting paid is not simply a matter of sending a bill. The bankruptcy court, appropriately so, closely oversees the amount and timing of payment of estate professional fees. And proper disclosure under the Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the “Bankruptcy Rules”) is critical for all estate professionals.

Virtually all public indentures contain provisions allowing the issuer to cure ambiguities and make other technical changes to the debt documentation without debtholder consent. When the purported ambiguities have substantive consequences, however, issuers may not be able to get away with an amendment that lacks debtholder approval. InGSO Coastline Credit Partners L.P. v. Global A&T Electronics Ltd. (NY App. Div. 1st Dept. May 3, 2016), a New York lower court bought into a “cure of ambiguity” argument and on that basis granted a motion to dismiss.